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PREFACE 
This is a study of a judgmental rating device termed the semantic 
differential. The semantic differential (or S.D.) was conceived some 
thirty years ago as a behavioral tool to measure human affective and 
emotive feeling. This study's principal purpose was to analyze some of 
the semantic differential's primary constructs with a view toward in-
creasing its validity. 
The seeds for this work probably were sown, unbeknownst at that 
time to the author, in a general. semantics class during the spring 
semester of 1977. It was always mysterious to me how small, black, in-
conspicuous books can wreak such profound effects on people. In under-
graduate days I used to feel genuine sympathy for some of my (more 
devoted) fellow students in the physical sciences whom I regularly would 
see live, eat and sleep with such objects. 
Then, at last, I was inspired. The little black book that did it, 
in my case, was Wendell Johnson's People in Quandaries. As inconspicu-
ous things may go, the book and its attendant university course surely 
stand at the·summit with high school typing as the two most invaluable 
courses I ever enrolled in, applied to practical everyday living. 
I would like to thank all those who had a part in this project. 
Especial among those is Dr. Walter J. Ward, director of graduate studies 
in Mass Communication at Oklahoma State University and my major adviser. 
He was a constant source of inspiration and guidance from beginning to 
completion. 
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Likewise, I would like to acknowledge the attention and assistance 
of other members of my committee, Dr. William R. Steng, associate 
professor of Journalism and Broadcasting, and Marshall E. Allen, asso-
ciate professor of Journalism and Broadcasting. 
To my mother and father, for no small measure of encouragement and 
support, I am indebted. 
Finally I must express my appreciation to Dr. Ray Harrell, longtime 
high school educator, dean of men, counselor, adviser, and most of all, 
friend. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
·From the beginning of recorded philosophical thought with the 
ancient Greeks through the much younger discipline of psychology in the 
19th Century, the pursuit of meaning has been a connnon calling. 
Characteristic of these two disciplines, their respective addres-
sings of meaning typically have had diverging purposes. In philosophy, 
meaning is focused upon as a second-order physical and conceptual 
phenomenon. It becomes an element of the philosopherts two-part problem 
of meaning and verification: First, how does one find out what is the 
meaning of a statement? Second, how does one find out whether the 
statement is true? To answer both, he must draw upon and make state-
ments about the meaning and truth of other statements. 1 
Psychology addresses meaning in the associational orb of stimulus 
and response. 
In an attempt to explain semantic generalization it has been 
hypothesized that meaning is actually a response which serves, 
in turn, as a cue • • . The generalization of a response from 
the word won to peat is based upon their common meaning. This 
makes the generalization possible • • • The galvanic skin 
response is first conditioned to the written word won. The 
subject is then exposed to the word beat, which already has 
the tendency to evoke the response won because of previous 
learning which established them as synonyms. The response 
won serves as the stimulus cue to evoke the galvanic skin 
response. In other words, beat is not directly linked to the 
1 
galvanic s.kin response; its capacity to evoke such a response 
is media ted by the ability o;( ~ to elicit ~· 2 
The only commonality (perhaps unfortunately) between the two 
disciplines in this- regard was that invariably the quest for meaning 
veered toward virtually every· object besides semantic meaning itself. 
The edification which was to provide an exclusive attention to meaning 
through words as symbols has only recently enjoyed considerable popu-
2 
larity--though its roots are nearly as remote in time as apcient philo-. 
3 
sophy. 
The study of general semantics, a term originated by Alfred 
Korzybski in 1933 as a name for a general theory of evaluation, is an 
empirical science which espouses a comprehensive method for human 
adjustment in our private, public, and professional lives. 4 It provides 
a system of evaluation and predictability in solving human thought-
process maladies. 
Modern-day application of general semantic thought began with 
Korzybski, a Polish-American scientist. 5 Korzybski, after the debacle 
of World War I, became convinced of ideational voids in the philo-psycho-
logical sciences; the precipitating factors of such human disasters 
which required addressing. 
In examination of human existential problems, he found vital a 
wholesale revision of old notions about human nature set down by the 
Greek philosopher Aristotle 2,300 years ago and largely used as a 
pattern for living by mankind since. 6 Korzybski likened the premise of 
his non-aristotlian system to an analogy of a map and its territory: 
First. A map is not the territory (notion of non-identity). 
Second. A map does not represent all of a territory (notion 
of non-allness) . -- --
Third. A map is self-reflexive in the sense that an 'idea' 
map should include a map of the map 1 etc.~ indeflni.tely 
(notion o;f non·-contradictionl. 
Applied to daily li,t'e and language: 
First. A word is not what i.t represents. 
Second. A word does not represent all of the tfacts 1 , etc. 
Third. Language is self-.reflexive in the sense that with 
language we can speak about language.7 
Korzybski concluded, through his research and a view of world 
history, that the composition and structure of these forms of represen-
tation (i.e., language) were instrumental in shaping the historical 
interaction and behavior of human cultures. 
Drawing contrast with an exact science he asked: 
tVhy is it that structures built by engineers do not as a rule 
collapse, or if they do, then the physico-mathematical or 
other evaluational errors are easily discovered; yet social, 
economic, political, etc., systems, also man-made, do spor-
adically collapse in the form of w·ars, revolutions, financial 
depressions, unemployment, etc? 
This led to the question: 
3 
What is it that engineers do neurologically when they build bridges, 
etc?9 
The answer was: 
They use a special, narrow but 'perfect' language called 
mathematics, which is similar in structure to the facts 
they deal with, and which therefore yields predictable 
empirical results.lO 
Korzybski.then investigated what builders of political, economic, 
social, and other inexact human behavioral sciences do and found that 
they utilize languages (forms of representation just as the engineer's 
mathematics) which are not similar to facts of exact sciences. Conse-
quently, these results are unpredictable and breakdowns or collapse 
follow. 
Works of a number of scholars including Johnson, Hayakawa, Lee and 
Thorndike followed, but the development of a standardized tool for 
measuring hunmn affective judgment of words and concepts was to be 
reserved for a Yale graduate student named Charles E. Osgood. Osgood 
had been interested in the way in which people draw inferences about 
what is happening at the semantic (ideational) level of a fellow com-
municant's mind. Indeed, we do not see and hear the mind of the other, 
but rather we observe his gestures and written or spoken words--other-
wise termed the communicative product. Osgood reported: 
An extensive survey of the literature fails to uncover any 
generally accepted, standarized method for measuring meaning 
. . • This certainly seems simple enough, yet it has troubled 
philosophers for centuries . . • Perhaps it is because of the 
philosophical haziness of this concept, perhaps because of 
the general belief that "meanings" are infinitely and uniquely 
variable, or perhaps because the word 'meaning' as a construct 
in our language connotes mental stuff, more akin to 'thought' 
and 'soul' than to anything observable--for some combination 
of reasons there has been little attempt to devise methods here. 
Nevertheless, whether looked at from the viewpoints of philos-
ophy or linguistics, from economic or sociological theory, or--
interestingly enough--from within the core of psychological 
theories of individual behavior, the nature of meaning and 
change in meaning are found to be central issues.ll 
Osgood's search for a more precise quantitative assessment of 
meaning expressed through words led him to adopt a controlled associa-
tion and scaling device based on philosophic-psychologic, semantic, and 
geometric principles. 
We provide the subject with a concept to be differentiated 
and a set of bipolar adjectival scales against which to do 
it, his only task being to indicate, for each item (pairing 
of a concept with a scale), the direction of his association 
and its intensity on a seven-step scale. The crux of the 
method, of course, lies in selecting the sample of descrip-
tive polar terms. Ideally, the sample should be as repre-
sentative as possible of all the ways in which meaningful 
judgments can vary, and yet be small enough in size to be 
efficient in practice. In other words, from the myriad 
linguistic and non-linguistic behaviors mediated by symbolic 
processes, we select a small but carefully devised sample, a 
sample which we shall try to demonstrate is chiefly indica-
tive of the ways that meanings vary, and largely insensitive 
to other sources of variation.l2 
4 
5 
Since its inception some twenty ...... ~ive years ago~ the techni.que o;l; 
semantic differentiation has increasingly- captured the interest and 
imagination of social researchers;, psychologists, behaviorists, and 
pollsters. The method has been utilized in a tremendous variety of 
studies, and in 1968 it was effectively used to help elect a president. 13 
Hundreds of related articles have appeared in the interim in trade and 
professional publications. 
Because of its extreme flexibility, and thus, proliferation (and 
~ubsequently its inevitable modification and contortion) in literature 
and studies of considerable variation, an understanding of the semantic 
differential and ramifications of utilization of varying models increas-
ingly has become difficult to obtain. 
In essence, the semantic differential is a scaling instrument 
designed to give quantitative representation to a continuum along which 
reactions, opinions, or judgments vary. In the early course of its use, 
the technique acquired its label through semantical orientation of the 
scale via polarized and/or graduated verbal-quantitative descriptions 
linked by geometric progression along the scale continuum. (See Figure 
1.) 
Figure 1. The Semantic Differential 
Scale 
The name for the process is not without its merits, since, as 
Osgood and Suci point out: II • this label points quite accurately 
6 
to the intended operation~ multiyariate differentiation of concept 
meanings in terms of a limi.ted number of semantic scales of known factor 
. . .. 14 
compOSltlOn. 
The device has proved to be a precise instrument for the recording 
of affective stimuli associations. Through analysis of a wide variety 
of studies, it has been determined that affective judgments on bipolar 
semantic differential scales tend to resolve themselves into three cate-
gories or dimensions, namely: Evaluation, Potency and Activity (other-
. d f . )15 w1se terme measures o semant1c space. The Evaluative dimension is 
represented by such scales as good--bad, kind--cruel, beautiful--ugly, 
fair--unfair and wise--foolish. Scales labeled with hard--soft, strong--
weak, large--small and masculine--feminine commonly connote Potency. 
The Activity dimension can be represented by fast--slow, hot--cold, 
h d 1 ~ d . . 16 s arp-- u .L an act1ve--pass1ve. Factor analysis of large groupings 
of semantic differential scales has demonstrated that frequency of 
occurrence of the three dimensions falls in the order listed above. 17 
The principles of semantic differential methodology may be summari-
zed as follows: 
1. Ratings on bipolar adjective scales--whatever the number 
and variety of scales used--are largely a function of a few 
dimensions of judgment. 
2. These dimensions or factors are meaningfully related to 
affect. 
3. A few appropriate scales can be used to obtain reliable 
measurements on any one dimension. 
4. Measurements made on a given dimension are comparable 
for stimuli of §reatly different character (words, colors, 
sounds, etc.) .1 
The Problem 
Utilizing Osgood's criteria for satisfactory measuring instruments, 
one can define academically what is desired of the ideal measurement 
tool for a given situational s.tudy; 
(a) Objectivity. The method should yield quantitative and 
verifiable (reproducible) data. (h) · Reliabili_!:y. It should 
yield the same values within acceptable margins of error, when 
the same conditions are duplicated, (c) Validity. The data 
obtained should be demonstrably covariant with those obtained 
with some other, independent index of meaning. (d) Sensitivity. 
The method should yield differentiations commensurate with the 
natural units of the material studied, i.e., should be able to 
reflect as fine distinctions in meaning as are typically made 
in communicating. (e) Comparability. The method should be 
applicable to a wide range of phenomena in the field, making 
possible comparisons among different individuals and groups, 
among different concepts, and so on. (f) Utility. It should 
yield information relevant to contemporary theoretical and 
practical issues in an efficient manner, i.e., it should not 
be so cumbersome and laborious as to prohibit collection of 
data at a reasonable rate.l9 
The great body of research heretofore accomplished appears to have 
7 
been concentrated in the areas of objectivity, reliability, validity and 
comparability. A review of the literature fails to reveal comprehensive 
d . 1 . . f . . . 20 stu y 1n t~e cr1ter1on o sens1t1v1ty. States Osgood: 
There has been no explicit statement of the relation between 
the theoretical conception of meaning as a representational 
mediation process, and the operations of measurement which 
.constitute the semantic differential technique.21 
Specifically, there has been a minimum of analysis on the geometric 
linguistic makeup of the measurement device itself especially as related 
to the portrayal of weighted/gradated semantic space of that scale. In 
this study, the question is one of whether quantitative differentiation 
of a semantic differential (S.D.) scale is significantly affected by 
(1) the mandatory allocation of responses to linearly and equidistantly 
gradated space within the scale, and (2) the inclusion of verbal dif-
ferentiators of intensity (termed "linguistic quantifiers" by Osgood) in 
pre-testing instructional material, on the evaluational scales them-
selves, or in analysis summaries to represent computed affective/emotive 
intensity. 
8 
Finally--and o;J; most· :L'lJ.pOX't ~ . i~ ei.ther or both of the above factors 
are significant~ is present measurement accuracy compromised? 
Purpos.e and Objectives 
Referring once again to item (d) of Osgoodts criteria for satis-
factory measuring instruments: 
Sensitivity. The method should yield differentiations 
commensurate with the natural units of material studied! 
i.e., should he able to reflect as fine distinctions in 
m~aning as are typically made in communicating. 
This study sought to determine if sensitivity of the S.D. scale 
could he increased. Could any enhanced specificity he wrought through 
design modifications in the scale itself and minor modifications in the 
method of analysis? Furthermore, would any such modifications increase 
the conformity of the S.D. scale to Osgood's criteria in the area 
identified above? 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
If the concept of "measurement" is important in research, it is 
doubly important in research on a measurement device itself. When the 
research forays upon a semantical measurement tool, the stage is really 
set. The researcher finds himself fighting two wars rather than one; 
not only is he struggling with the primary analysis for which purpose 
his work is justified, but he is warring semantically with every funda-
mentalist definition of measurement. 
Probably the gravest error of a student of semantics would be to 
make the Aristotelean assumption that his weights and standards were an 
actual measure of an entity, rather than an attribute of the entity to 
a convention established by him or his peers. 
The point was made succinctly by Kerlinger, who suggested the situa-
tion of a male judge who was asked to stand near an attractive young 
woman and rate her qualities of niceness, strength of character, person-
ality, musical ability, and intelligence on a scale of one to five. 1 
Deduced scientifically, the problem would be "How will he ever analyze 
the criteria by simply looking at her? 11 Deduced semantically, the prob-
lem becomes "How will we analyze the findings if he gets them? 11 
It is easy to understand why one analyst wrote: 
In exasperation about the confusion in theories of measurement, 
11 
it is tempting to wish that there were no yardsticks and no 
balances . . . Then all scientists might more readily see that 
measurement is a matter of convention rather than of discov-
ering the 'real' measure.2 
But every measurement is purposive. So long as the system is a 
method commonly understood for what it is by the encoder, transmitter/ 
receiver and decoder, it is scientifically and semantically worthwhile. 
It may help move mountains or crack atoms. 
To be measurable, an attribute must fit the specifications of a 
12 
. . . bl 3 quant1tat1ve var1a e. And to the degree one is successful in defining 
attributes in a quantitative manner, a reason for devising a system to 
measure those attributes is established. 4 Notably, it makes no sense to 
attempt a measurement of some attributes. A person's name, place of 
birth, or race might be examples. The property observed, then, is both 
dependent on man's ability to conceive it and his efficacy in observing 
. 5 J.t. 
As science develops new analytic abilities in every facet of obser-
vational phenomena, there are fewer and fewer areas that justifiably can 
exclude it. £very triumph for the scientific approach is one more strike 
against the Old Man's prescientific civilization. 6 As Protagoras an-
nounced, "Men are the measure of all things." 
Evolution of the Semantic 
Differential 
Although the semantic differential is a relatively recent develop-
ment, its ancestry is not. Attitudinal- and ability- studies in the psy-
chological and sociological sciences have precipitated a variety of data-
gathering tools. Evolution of the semantic differential can be traced 
through these works. 
13 
Guilford reports the first rating scale to be applied to a psycho-
logical problem was by Galton on a vividness-of-image test in 1883. 7 
Pearson used a seven-point scale for estimating intelligence in 1906. 8 
L. L. Thurstone enhanced methodology with his incorporation of 
equal-appearing intervals into the rating scale in 1929. 9 He was in-
tent on devising an attitude polling device which reflected a range of 
choices actually possessed by the public. Thurstone utilized a panel 
of judges drawn from the subject population to rank-order a group of 
social issues. He then took those statements which most nearly repre-
sented an ascending equidistant discriminal distribution, and used 
these to compose the attitude scale. Other statements were discarded. 
In Thurstone's scale, the lower the scale value, the more positive 
the attitude, as is demonstrated in a 1929 questionnaire addressing 
social attitudes toward the church. 
(1) I believe the church is the greatest institution in 
America today. (scale value: .2) 
(2) I believe in religion, but I seldom go to church. 
(scale value: 5.4) 
(3) I think the church is a hindrance to religion for 
it still depends upon magic, superstition, and myth. 
(scale value: 9.6)10 
The normal distribution·of scale items then would approximate the 
curve in Figure 2.11 
Figure 2. Distribution of Discriminal Differences 
14 
Items were subsequently assembled into a questionnaire in the format 
12 depicted in Table I. As Goode and Hatt note~ each item becomes a 
scale, and the total scale is in essence a battery of scales.l3 
TABLE I 
THURSTONE EQUAL-APPEARING INTERVAL 
MEASUREMENT ITEM 
Strongly 
Agree 
(1) 
Agree 
(2) 
Uncertain Disagree 
I Believe the Church 
is the Greatest 
Institution in 
America Today 
(3) (4) 
Strongly . 
Disagree 
(5) 
The very factors which advanced Thurstone's equal-appearing inter-
val research beyond previous works were also grounds in part for his most 
significant criticism--the scale's values were dependent upon the number 
and character of the judges selected. 14 However, his work was manu~ 
mental for three reasons: (1) the development of the method of internal 
consistency (items were relevant only if they were endorsed in similar 
fashion to other items with equivalent scale values), (2) the introduc-
tion of a verbal measure of intensity on scales (strongly agree, agree, 
uncertain ••• as above), and (3) the use of equal-intervals, or equi-
distant gradations_of intensity. 
15 
Scales have exhibited a prolif.eration of designs since, but one 
common feature of virtually all is. the attempt to represent gradations 
between polar opposites in equal fractional increments. The scales in 
Figures 3 and 4 are examples of several techniques developed by Louis H. 
15 Guttman and colleagues. All produce essentially the same results but 
differ somewhat in mechanics involved. 16 
·I. A Nation of Nations does a good job of analyzing the ethnic groups in this 
country. 
~ Strongly agree 4 ___ Agree 3 
__ Undecided 2 
·-- Disagree '1 · --~ Strongly disagr~ 0 
2. On the whole, A Nation of Nations is not as good as most college textbooks: 
__ Strongly agree 0 __ Agree I __ Undecided 2 
__ Disagree 3 
___ Strongly disagree 4 
3. Adamic organize~ and presents .his material very well 
·· _. _ Strongly agree 4 __ Agree 3 _ Undecided 2 
_. ·  __ Disagree 1 
__ Strongly disagree 0 
4. A! a sociological treatise, Adamic's book does not rate very high. 
·-- Strongly agree 0 __ Agree I __ . Undecided 2 
· __ Disagree 3 
__ Strongly disagree 4 
5. Adamic does not discuss any one group i~ sufficient derail so that a student 
can obtain a real insight into problems of ethnic gnmp relations in this 
country. 
__ Strongly agree 0 ___ Agree I 
__ Undecided 2 
__ Disagree 3 
__ Strongly disagree 4 
6. By providing a panorama of various groups, A Nation of Nations Jets the 
student get a good perspective on ethnic group relation'> in this country. 
__ Strongly agree 4 __ AgTee 3 __ Undecided 2 
_. __ Disagree I 
__ Strongly disagree 0 
7. A Nation of Nations is good enough to be kept :1s a textbook for this course.· 
__ ._ Strongly agree 4 ___ Agree 3 Undecided 2 
__ Disagree I 
__ Strongly disagree 0 
Figure 3. The "Cornell" Technique for Scale and Inten-
sity Analysis 
I would go out on a date \vith a Negro. 
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree 
4 3 2 1 
Stror.gly disagree 
0 
\Vhe11 possible, I would avoid sitting next to a Negro. 
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree-
0 1 2 3 4 
Figure 4. "Cornell" Technique (Variation) 
Apparent of any rating scale is its two-part composition: (1) an 
instruction, to orient the respondent to its subject and identify the 
property of the continuum, and (2) a scale, defining the points of gra-
dation. The latter may be accomplished verbally or by graphics.l7 
.. 'Now I am going to ask you how you would judge a number ot occupations. 
• For example, a railroad brakeman-which statement on t-his card (HAND RESPOND-
ENT [rating] D.RD) bt:st gives your own personal opinion of the general standing 
o[ a railro'l-d brakeman? (PAUSE) \VJut number on tbat cud would you pick out 
for him?' (RECORD ANSWER.) . 
. "'Try not to judge a job a'cording to your own opinion of some one person 
you :know who has suu.'-1 a job. N'ow, how V.'Ould you judge a ••. ?' (PrzocrED 
THROUGH LIST OF OCCUPATIO~S.) . 
"'the rating card banded the respondent is :reproduced below: 
,;'For ea~h job mentioned, please pick out rh~ statement that ·best gives your 
own pe:sonal opinion of the g~neral standing tl1at such a job has. 
I. Excellent standing. 
2. Good standing.. 
3. Average standing. . 
4. Somewhat. bdo--..v average standing. 
5. Poor standing. 
X. I don't know where to place that one.'" 
Figure 5. The Descriptive Technique 
Most conspicuous in the technique represented in Figures 5 and 6 
is its weakness: It presumes an equal interval between description 
16 
gradations, and it liroits. res.pondent discrimination to 
"fHE OHIO 
SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE SCALE 
For tho Intermediate Grades 
lullc4 ~ 
(;.~10 SO!OUl<S81J" ~T$ ao& DIYISIOl'l •I HEIJX1).!(1 SC~YIS.IOI& 
STA1"3 DE.PAR'T:"\EX1' 0?' E~.J.TiOl't 
COU . J\Bld, Or!IO 
l'upar&d b_? 
. Tb• l?••ll• El-~"'tr.~y T"s:c.l'IQ!ra 
lA C••pc.ratio• nltki 
Tb• C.lt•s• •• Edac&th .. , The m.l .. stat. rat~t'.Xf-1 
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such .• 
'OIRf.C.TIO~I Cn a -s.pa.rate t~le&t you 'N111 !ind ths na:J~~J ot ev!ry Stl.A.1~nt 1n yonr c1.:1!!.5 • 
. t:e rtant you to put a Jw::t'l::6l" in !rant or every l'4:.!&. Th& ma'Der- you ;;ut. c!o~n should ba tlle 
n~oor or one or t.b..a !ollc .. 1cg parav-ar..hs. 
"7-:r •1h•r 
JrJ••dJO." 
"'>lt~l frl••dA_. 
~Iii O't.•y .... 
"D-o~'t b"' 
tb, •• • 
~o't c.ara 
for tb••• .. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
I 'i'c'Ould !!lea to ha¥8 tl11~ pe·rson a.s on8 or r.r:!' ~·1"1'• ..,.r~ "•~• · 
!r1end!. I l"'OUld l1ka to spend a lot or tic& ..-1 L'l th13 ~~!"SOil and 
,...out~ enjoy E:,Olr_g' pl3CBS with t!i13 person. I l'tOUld tell SO:::x1 or~ 
troubla!f and so.-:-_$ or i:lY secrfl.ts to this ~l·son and 'Woullt do every-o 
th1r.g I could t;) help this per:!~n out or trou":J;le. I 't'!lll &1v., a 
~"'1.EU1 GNI.': to m:J -r•r16 Yr.:ry ta•t fr1en~. 
. . . . .. 
I lt'Ou1d enjoy hor\:1,16 a..id Mlrg l'f1Ui t.i1s })oCJnon. I l1Cult1 !nvtta 
th1~ tJ.:tr3on to n l.:'t.4tY. ar:.d l'IOuld en~oy gotng on ptcntc!l \OilL'1 L'll:l 
~~~~0ih~d~~~~o~~~.ild!~ul~ ~~~;dt;t~r~0wi~KL~~~ ~~~:o~~~n~0 t· .. ~~f: 
like t:J ~with t1i1s J:l"'rson o!~en. I "'ant ~1\s par2on to M on~ 4Jot 
r:.y tr1end3.. I Yt1ll g1vtt a t-.Ui't3tA 1~0 to every p-6'r~n ~a 1~ =1 
!r1end. 
. . "' .. 
I WO\lld oo ..,111111'; to t» on a coc:.l!tto& wlth this p;.rsOl'l ~r to !" ~~­
the S.?38 club. It l'lould 't.e s.lt r1t:lt ror th!s ~r-son to M on t.t~ 
5~ t~R..OJ. w1t!l r::a OI" to l1va 1n cy r,a1r..'l-J.Nr!1ood. I ~ould t"' 1:1 &. 
play with th1:5 pe~rson.. l l'<ould just as socn '~'--Corle r.t th t~ta ~...or~Q 
ln school. 'rh!s person 1s not or.e ot ~ rrlend!'l, b•Jt t t!l1;;.K L11s 
~fr!~~~s~~-;0~1ihiht~ i!l~ru;1 ~~~:~.:5L-=t Tit.~ ln front or t~a r..L:Jrt 
• '* • • • 
I ~o not kr\a" th!~ r-ar-son very ""'11. 1"-VOO T ''"Jt•l~ l!ko t.h!o vo•-
llon. t.:ljbe r wouldn't. I d0n't knO'r'l' 1f I 't"'OUld l!i<a to 00 ... 1t11. t!':1S 
per~.on. I will ~ut a J,lJii.Eill f'OVR l:t front or t?":a r.z.r:t'l or evert J;,.i"'-
san I don• t kno"" very 't18ll. 
• * * •• 
1 ray -nolJo• l"lhenet.::-r. 1 ca<'t th!!! ;-ar~'Jn 3.I'Oui'l<1 tc...~ool or on t1':• 
street, but I Co r.ot <enj8y M1ng wtth t~13 persona I o!3,?1t ~ 
scc:e t!~a "r''it.h thts V!3r~;on 1! } Qi1n't !-.J.va enyt..'l-].1r.g el:>d to C:o. tut 
1 would rath13r be n1r...'l scr:-eCodt else-. I C:on•t c~a tor t..~l3 ~·l":r~ 
\'ery t::uch. 1 h11.l t;!.Y& a. I.;,.,l"ffi:_--={ Fl'r!.: to ~ao_;Jla 1 Con•t. ca.ro !cr 
VH:J PJo. 
. .. . . . 
1 !ly....~ ta th 13 p;,r-~n only 'When 1 t 15 na-cllss.arj. I do cot 11~~ to 
t~ont .,!t.,;. t.11:t ~er:ron and nould rntht•u~ nvt Lll}l; to thl!J ~r6on. I 
w111 g,1ver a J,-tfr8:t:R SlX to every p-3rson 1 Co not llX~. 
• • • •• 
L--------------------------------------------
l 
f 
___ J 
Figure 6. The Descriptive Technique (Variation) 
Graphic methods of scale portrayal, such as that in Figure 7, 
exhibit much more versatility and, properly constructed, have the 
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b '1' 1 . . . . . 19 a :i. 1ty to at east muum:J...ze cont1nuum segmentat:J..on, 
'You are asked to rate your instiuctor in terms o£ a nur::1ber of characteristics. 
\Vill you place a d1ccl mark (v) at the place on each line which you think best 
:i:lescribes his usual manner of teaching? 
1. In regard to enthmiasm for his subject, does he appear to be: 
__ J-_________ 1___ ______ ~----------~--------~--
:Intensely 
"Intere-sted 
Jn his 
fUbject 
l>J;~tter? 
,-
Ddini~dy 
intcre5ted 
but not 
int~ly 
so? 
Mildly 
interested? 
Rather 
more 
disinterested 
than 
interested? 
Figure 7. · The Graphic Technique 
Definitely 
bored by 
the 
mal erial? 
Guilford, et. al., in discussing a scale 1 s discriminatory power, 
maintained: 
In terms of psychometric theory, the advantage always is 
with using more rather than fewer steps. This is demon-
strated by the numerous studies showing that the reliability 
of individual rating scales is a monotonically increasing 
function of the number of steps . . • Essentially the same 
principle is derivable from another body of evidence, that 
concerning relations between the number of scale steps and 
the information (or amount of discrimination) found in 
classical methods of psychophysical scaling.20 
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With enhanced use of graphic measurement scales came the facility 
to increase the number of steps--and, thus, discriminability (see 
Figure 8). 21 
It was not long before advantages of quantification of such scales 
were recognized. 
The numerical results provided by standardized measure have 
two advantages. First, numerical indices make it possible to 
report results in finer detail than would be the case with 
personal judgments. Thus the availability of thermometers 
makes it possible to report the exact increase in temperature 
. • . rather than only that ~the temperature increase (d).~ 
A second advantage of quantification is. that it permits the 
use of powerful methods of mathematical analysis. This is 
essential in the elaboration of theories and in the analysis 
of experiments. Although it may be a long time off for 
psychology, it is reasonable to believe that all theories 
eventually will be expressed in mathematical form.22 
lHE COM?AHl' HI lliE AD/' 
Figure 8. Scalar Device for Measuring 
Attitudes Toward a Company 
.Korzybski's contention (see Introduction) of the need for a 
19 
"precise" language--such as mathematics--in the behavioral sciences was 
being incorporated in attitudinal measurement. An inexorable pattern of 
23 
scalar construction began to evolve (see Figures 9 and 10). 
Completely 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Figure 9. "Boxed" Graphic/Numerical 
Completely 
agree 
Strongly 
dis3grce 
. . . . 
. . . . 
-- ~-- --- _.......__ -- ---- -- -- -- ---~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Figure 10. Graphic/Numerical 
Strongly 
agree 
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With Osgood's introduction of the semantic differential (S.D.) in 
the 1940's, graphic development of the S.D. measurement device itself 
.(with minor modifications) largely has remained static. Since his 
landmark study (The Measurement of Meaning) was published in 1957, the 
conformative style of the Osgoodian scale has tended to exhibit a con-
tinuum bounded by polar opposites and segmented to denote linear gra-
dation of intensity throughout its length.24 
In conducting a study of social stereotypes with a method inspired 
by Warren,25 Stagner and Osgood found, through factor analysis, a large 
·grouping of descriptive scales that ,tended to resolve into three highly 
intercorrelated clusters.26 These subsequently were termed evaluative, 
potency, and activity dimensions of meaning (see Introduction). The 
term "semantic differential" has since come to refer not to one but a 
battery of scales which, taken together, comprehensively measure affec-
tive judgment in all three areas, as shown in Figure 11.27 
Although it will be convenient here to speak of the semantic 
differential, the term is used in a generic sense to refer 
to (a) collection of rating scales anchored by bipolar adjec-
tives. Rather than the semantic differential being a parti-
cular instrument (or test, as some have called it), it is a 
very flexible approach to obtaining measures of attitudes and 
other sentiments. The flt?xibility of the approach is one of 
its appealing features. The object that is rated is 
referred to as a concept, and anything that can be named can 
be rated, e.g., Winston Churchill, peach ice cream, labor 
unions, birth control, my best friend, and automobiles.28 
SCHOOL 
(E) _ 1. pleasant ---~-----------,---------- unpleasant 
(A) 2. angular 
{A) *3. passive 
. ' 
(£). *4. ugly 
(P) *5. ddicate 
(A) 6. fast ·. 
(£) 7. good 
(P) *8. weak 
(A) *9. dull 
(P) ·1 0. deep 
(P) II. heavy 
(£)*12. dark 
-----------------------~---- roumkd 
----------------------------~---- active 
------------------------------~----- beautiful 
---~---__; __________ ~--__; ____ rugged 
slow 
----~----------------------------
bad 
--------------~-------------------
----------------------------strong 
-------------------------
·sharp 
shallow 
------------------------------
----------------------------
light 
--------------------------------
bright 
(E) = Evaluative, (P) Potency, (A) Activity 
Figure 11. The Semantic Differential 
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The Semantic Differential 
in Practice 
The semantic differential, with all its recognition and acclamation, 
has not been an immaculate conception by any means. Despite its being 
afforded a proliferation of studies and reviews by psychologists, psycho-
linguists, semanticists and researchers of other pursuits over the past 
twenty-five years, there appear to this writer several ominous assump-
tions by practitioners of the method which must be addressed. 
A review of literature lends credence to Osgood's assertion that 
S.D. technique generally satisfies criteria of measurement in categories 
of objectivity, reliability, validity, comparability and utility. 29 The 
conspicuous omission, as the author sees it, is the criterion of ~ensi-
tivity. Osgood, early on, believed that 
The question of sensitivity of the method comes down to 
whether it is able to reflect as fine distinctions in meaning 
as are ordinarily made. We have incidental (sic.) evidence 
that a semantic. differential can tease out nuances in 
meaning ... 30 
Other impinging factors considered equal, any enhanced refinement 
in measurement specificity in this criterion can have only a positive 
effect upon other criteria, and, therefore, the over-all accuracy of the 
technique. Sensitivity, then, was the core issue in this study. 
Although Guilford maintained that discriminative ability of an 
affective measurement tool tended to increase with augmented incrementa-
tion to twenty steps, 31 others have contended, through the principle 
of sununated scales, that such is not necessarily the case. 32 According 
to the latter theory, the number of steps on a single scale used to 
measure an attribute would be critical. However, if a battery of scales 
were utilized (say, a half dozen), all of which measure the same 
attribute, six or seven steps would suffice. In this case, the reli-
ability of the summed ratings is directly linked to the correlation 
among that group of scales. 
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This would seem to be the case with the semantic differential. It 
operates as a battery of scales represented by bipolar adjective iden-
tifiers--purported through factor analysis to measure three meaning 
dimensions. 
Nonetheless, few analysts have been willing to gamble that this is 
always the case.33 Indeed, some--directly addressing the S.D.--have 
endorsed an increase to a 20-point, or even a 30-point scale.34 A com-
plete overhaul of the present scale even has been suggested. 35 Scale 
incrementation thus formed the first of two major considerations in this 
study. 
Korzybski's recognition of the need for a "precise" language--such 
as mathematics--in the social sciences, and the increased use of quan-
tification in social research information retrieval was addressed previ-
ously. One outstanding feature of the semantic differential is its 
ability to quantify human affective/emotive judgment, and dispose it to 
the gamut of scientific operations available through mathematical per-
mutation and analysis. Only to that extent will behavioral research 
findings and conclusions be as reliable as those of exact sciences. As 
Johnson has said, "The language of science is the better part of the 
method of science."36 
It probably can be said safely that, once past the encoding stage, 
such information is in safe hands ••• at least until the quantitative 
results are decoded, or "interpreted" into our imprecise, multiordinal 
verbal language.37 The challenge of the semantic differential or any 
other retrieval system, then, must lie with what might be termed its 
"encoding efficiency." 
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The question in this case is: In the S.D.'s role as a tool to 
measure meaning, are its own variables interpreted the same by respon-
dents and administrators alike? There already has been evidence to the 
contrary among administrators themselves, Attempts verbally to repre-
sent scale gradations in an equitable manner have caused considerable 
consternation among academicians, as is demonstrated in Figures 12 
through 15. 
There appear to be several items begging attention here. For in-
stance, who is to say that "mostly X" in the scale of Figure 13 is e.qui-
valent to the "quite X" of the scale in Figure 14? Would an inquirer 
find anywhere near unanimity of agreement that "extremely Y" in the 
scale of Figure 14 equals "very Y" of the scale in Figure 15? Are 
"mostly/quite" and "very/extremely," respectively, congruent verbal 
barometers of intensity? In these two particular examples they are used 
to denote the same relative points of their respective continuums. One 
study lists as many as nine different adverbs used to earmark scalar 
gradation. 38 
Fortunately, there more recently has been a certain standardization 
to Osgood's battery of "linguistic quantifiers" depicted in Figure 14, 
This has solved part of the problem. Now it can be asked: Do respon-
dents envision similar points in semantic space for Osgood's conven-
tional linguistic quantifiers (neither/equally, slightly, quite, very/ 
extremely)? This is actually a two-part question; the first being 
whether respondents interpret them in the order presented, Furthermore, 
are they seen as falling into the neat equidistant pattern stepped off 
in the scale? Order and degree of the linguistic quantifier was the 
second major point addressed in this study. 
25 
The content 
of rn.1ny cor;1plcx linguistic 2sscrtions 
(e.g., "I don't think thoe Chinese. 
Cowmunis\s arc to be trusted") c;J.n 
be reduced to th~ allou.tion of a 
concept 1o a ~ca1c, e.g., 
CKIS f':S Z CO~l.-IU:-i I ':ITS: 
tnH t M"nrt~y __ : _....:__: __ : __ ::;(__:_ un trus lworthy. 
The greater the intensity of particular 
;::ssertions (e.g., "These Chinese Com-
mu!Jists are completdy untrust-
worthy"), the more extreme becomes 
the allocation tow;nd one or the other 
of the polar terms. 
Source: C. E. Osgood and G. J. Suci, 
"Factor Analysis of Hcaning," 
Jou~~ _?f Exper._ J:'sycb..:_ (1955) 
Com,:J!eteiy 
disagree 
Figure 12. 
1 . 2 3 4 
Rationale of the 
Semantic Dif-
ferential 
(Early) 
5 6 
Completely 
agree 
In some instances, hm•;<:;•:er, the numbers are defind and written in 
spac<cs opposite the objects to be rated, ~nste;:.d of having the appropriate 
numbers marked on a graphic scale. lt is customary to 1t:fer to these 
as 1l_U.!!_I_crical scales ra~h:::r than as graphic scales. The issue, however, 
usualfy concerns V1hether there will b2 numbers emplsyed with a graphic 
scale or without a graphic scale. NL!cn_h<>rs_ ;He used_as anchors ir. most 
,. rating s:::ales. The numbers must first be defined, e.g.: 
1 Cornp!etcly d:sagree 
e Mo<>tly uisJgree 
8 sriehtry dis2grce 
4 Slightly agree 
6 Mostly Jgree 
6 Completely aeree 
Source: J. C. Nunnally, Psychometric Theory (Neo;-.r York, 1967). 
Figure 13. Semantic Differential with Linguistic Quanti-
fiers (Variation) 
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The content 
of rn.u1y cor;1plcx: linguistic assertions 
(e.g., "I don't think these Chinese 
ColfJmunisis <liC to be trusted") can 
be rcdu~cd tiJ tho: a!loction of ~ 
concept to a ~calc, e.g., 
CHI!'lP.S~ C0'!.-1\./Ulii~TS: 
tnntwort\y __ : ____ :~ __ : __ :_?C_~~ untrm~·.\'orthy. 
The grca ter the intensity of particular 
::ssertions (e.g., "T'hesc Chinese Corn-
m\Jnists are coinplctdy untrust-
worthy"), the more extreme becomes 
the allocatiorr toward C'nc or the other 
of d1e pobr terrns. 
Source: C. E. Osgood and G. J. Suci, 
"Factor Analysis of Meaning," 
Journ. of Exper. Psych. (1955) 
Cornpr!:teiy 
disagree 
Figure 12. 
. 1 ' 2 3 4 
Rationale of the 
Semantic Dif-
ferential 
(Early) 
5 6 
Completely 
agree 
In some instances, howc:•:er, the numbers are defined and written in 
spacr::s opposite the objects to be rated, ~nslead of having the appropriate 
numbers marked on a giaphic sc,lle. It is customary to ;£:fer to these 
as n ... ll!_tl_crical sca1es ra~her than c:s graphic scales. The issue, howev~r. 
usually concerns v.hether there will b:c numbers employed with a graphic 
scale or without a graphic scale. Nt!cn_!wrs_ Me used as anchors ir. most 
,, rating s:::ares. The numbers rnust first be defined, e.g.: 
1 Comp!ekfy d:sagree 
z Mo-;try c..fisagree 
s s:iehtry discgree 
4 Slightly agree 
6 Mostly agree 
G Cornpfetefy agree 
Source: J. C. Nunnally, Psychometric Theory (New York, 1967). 
Figure 13. Semantic Differential with Linguistic Quanti-
fiers (Variation) 
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Each 
item (pairing of a specific concept with a specific scale) presents 
the following situation: · 
(CONCEPT). 
polar term X--=-·-:--=--=--· : __ : __ polar term Y 
(1) {2) (3) (4) (5) (6) {7} 
in which the scale positions have already been defined for the sub., 
ject in the instructions (see Chapter 3) as: 
(1) extrentely X (7) extremely Y 
(2) quite X {6) quite Y 
(3) slightly X (5) slightly Y 
(4) neither X nor Y; equally X andY 
\\'r e shall assume that1 on the basis of a great deal of prior experl· 
ence in encoding, the terms "extremely," "quite," and "slightly?' a2 
linguistic quantifiers have been associated with more or less equal 
degrees of intensity of whatever representational process (X or Y) 
happens to be elicited, and therefore, that the sign combinationa 
. "extremely X," "quite X," and so forth will elicit an rm of the 
quality X end of the intensity given by the quantifier. · 
Source: C. E. Osgood, G. J. Suci, and P. H. Tannenbaum, The Meas-
urement ~Meaning (Urbana, Ill.,. 1957). 
Figure 14. The Semantic Differential and Attendant Lin-
guistic Quantifiers (Osgoodian Convention) 
27 
"The purpose of this study is to measure the 
meanings of c<:rtaiu words to various people by 
having the;n judge each word against a series of 
descriptive scales. In taking this ·test, please 
ju~ge the words on i.he basi~ of what they mNn 
to you. Each numk<-red item presents a coJ.;cEP1' 
(such as DICTATOR). ;;nd a ~calc (such as high-
lofil). You are to r.ne the concept on th~ 7-point 
scale indic'! ted. 
If you felt that the concept was vny clouly 
aJJociGkd with one end of the scale, you might 
place your check mark as follows: 
DICTATOR: 
: :·X down. up ___ _ 
-~-------------
"If you fclc that the concept was quit~ closdy 
r~lat~d to one side of the scale, you might check 
as follows: 
!lOUSE: 
straight :X crooked. 
----------------
"If the concepnecmed only slightly rAaud to 
o:H· side as oppo;cd <o the other, you might check 
as follows: 
CLOUD: 
easy : X : difficult. --~~--~~~--~-~~ 
"If you considered the ;cale comphtdy ir-
rdroant, or both sidu tqually aJJociat~d, you 
. would check the middle space on the scale: 
TREE: 
idealistic ___ :_X_._:__ ____ n:a lis ti.::. 
Source: Osgood and Sud; · Journ. · of 
Exper. Psych. (1955). 
Figure 15. Semantic Differ-
ential with 
Linguistic 
Quantifiers 
(Variation) 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
Introduction 
If measurement is the means by which mathematics may be applied to a 
science, it follows that to the extent behavioral research emends its 
measurement tools, it refines itself as a science. 
It has been noted that all sciences begin empirically--as bodies of 
correlated observation and data--and progress toward the theoretical. 1 
This "evolution" of the sciences can be seen in their relative status 
today. The "exact" sciences such as physics, mathematics and chemistry, 
which found their origins tens of hundreds of years ago in philosophy, 
are now relatively far more sophisticated than the behavioral sciences. 
Thus biology and psychology are yet largely correlational pursuits where-
as physics and chemistry are for the most part theoretical. 
It is more than a mere coincidence that the sciences would 
order themselves in largely the same way if they were classi-
fied on the basis of the degree to which satisfactory measure-
ment of their important variables has been achieved. The 
development of a theoretical science ... would seem to be 
virtually impossible unless its variables can be measured 
adequately. kid one of the primary differences between the 
social and behavioral sciences on the one hand and the physi-
cal sciences on the other lies in the procedures used for 
measuring their important concepts. 2 
In behavioral sciences where there is certainly a wealth of observ-
ables but few precise instruments, the great ·promise of the semantic 
differential as a controlled association and scaling device to measure 
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connotative meaning, probably cannot be overemphasized. The task of this 
work was to add some degree of articularity and specificity--and thus 
emendment--to the seale's design. 
Hypotheses 
Segmentation versus Sustentation 
Figures 16 and 17 understate the need for enhanced resolution on the 
S.D. scale. There are a number of analyses that may be run on scores 
derived from the semantic differential, but in each case computations 
begin with the assignment of numbers 1 through 7 (more or less depending 
on incrementation) to scale positions as shown in Figure 16.3 
Means from the total sampling of scores may then be tabulated. Such 
a tabulation, replotted over a master grid, takes on a geometric form as 
depicted in Figure 17. As can be ascertained, group scores rarely fall 
n~atly into the stepped positions of the Osgoodian scale. Rather, they 
tend to ignore any segregation of space and retrofit into a type of 
continuum.4 
This plot, plus Osgood's own report that changes/ differences in 
group means as small as .5 scale units are significant at the .05 level 
of reliability, appeared to be major indicants that further study in 
scale design was warranted. 5 Other substantiating material, having evi-
dential bearing on what this writer earlier termed "encoding efficiency" 
of the S.D. scale, was located. Notable among these were two works. 
Tukey states: 
Many times scale makers and measurers stop far short of the 
limit (of measurement discriminability) set by the danger of 
non-cooperation (from respondents) .... If more than 10% are 
exact checks (on test-retest scores), either the scale is too 
coarse, or the duplicates are not independent. 6 
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Figure 17. 
Note: Either bi-polar adjectives or 
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Gulliksen applied this to the semantic differential: 
In Osgood's data (The Neasurement of Meaning, pp. 129-132), 
54.0% of complete agreements indicates extremely coarse 
grouping for determining the standard error of measurement. 
In terms of a normal curve this middle interval is at least 
1.4 sigma in width. The problem is pointed out by Osgood 
himself .•. 'On many individual items ... the variance 
approaches zero.' Clearly, it is not possible to determine 
accuracy of measurement when such coarse grouping is used. 
For any measurement one needs a unit so fine that a reason-
able determination of error is possible • . . If more than 10% 
are exact checks, either the scale is too coarse, or the 
duplicates are not independent. Even if one sets a standard 
of 20% or 30% identical re-measur~t~~ instead-of only 10%, 
it is still cle~r that the .Z.-category seale results in far toQ_ 
coarse grouping,S 
Linguistic Quantifi~rs Questioned 
This rationale was carried a step further. During the course of 
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literature review, a definite evolutionary trend toward scales exhibiting 
variations of a continuum ~vas indicated. If scalar segmentation was 
hypothesized to be a culprit of design bias, it would be reasonable to 
also regard as suspect any system of insular emphasis within the semantic 
scale space. This practice is obviously the norm in the conventional 
7-point S.D. scale, where subjects are mandated to respond to segregated 
space according to the legend (1) very/extremely X, (2) quite X, (3) 
slightly X, (4) neither X nor Y; equally X andY, (5) slightly Y, (6) 
quite Y, (7) very /extremely Y. 
Osgood (1957) says he assumes the linguistic quantifiers are asso-
ciated with more or les~ equal degrees of intensity of the quality of X 
or Y elicited.9 Furthermore, he maintains that these quantifiers, 
radiating in both directions from a central origin, do yield nearly 
equal psychological measurement units in the judgment process.10 
The question posed at this point was of two parts. First, are 
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Osgood's linguistic quantifiers actually perceived in the order of 
intensity he states? For instance, is it a justifiable presumption that 
"very" and "extremely" are semantically interchangeable affective terms? 
Is "quite" always viewed as falling above "slightly" and below "very" or 
"extremely" on a gradient of intensity? Second, do these linguistic 
quantifiers represent to the respondent the precise points and intervals 
Osgood has so delineated on the S.D. scale? 
These questions paved the way for setting down logic around which 
subsequent work in this study revolved. The first hypothesis actually 
dealt with two points. It tested respondent weightings of Osgood's 
adverbial measures of intensity, and compatibility of those ratings with 
the 7-step equidistant scale. The second hypothesis served as a check on 
Osgood's assumption that certain adverbs are interchangeable as inten-
sity measures. This postulation, while not a direct odds with Osgood's 
second hypothesis regarding equivalent experimental continua, would 
nonetheless probably justify a modification in subject application if 
vindicated. 11 
The hypotheses were: 
1. Allocation of perceived linguistic quantifier midpoints to S.D. 
scales of increased resolution will result in significant variation' from 
the Osgoodian equal-interval standard. 
2. The adverbs "very/extremely" and "equally/neither", respective-
ly, represent significantly different points on unprescripted scales. 
The Questionnaire 
Osgood himself.has recognized, 
An instrument is sensitive to the degree that it renders 
discriminations commensurate with the natural units of the 
material being studied; ideally it should yield distinctions 
as fine, or even finer, than those made on common sense 
grounds. Sensitivity ~hus implies both reliability and 
,:validity .12 
Why practitioners haven't applied this ascription to the design of the 
S.D. scale is, to this writer, an anomaly. Says Nunnally: 
Any (student) . . . will learn . • . that the reliability esti-
mate obtained in any particular study is independent of the 
number of persons in the study, but in any study the reli-
ability is directly related to the number of items on the 
test.l3 
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If a survey's reliability can be increased by increasing its items, why 
shouldn't item sensitivity be increased by increasing its measurement 
resolution? 
With this notion in mind~ \vork was initiated on an instrument design 
which could capture the information that would be needed in test of the 
hypotheses set down. A list of considerations to account in composition 
of ·the device was assembled: 
1. Number of Steps or Points 
2. Scale Segmentation 
3. Nature and Size of the Continuum 
4. Inclusion of Graphic or Numerical Anchors 
5. Orientation of Scale 
6. Instructions/Descriptive Phrases 
7. Adaptability of Retrieved Data to Quantification and Analysis 
Literature was reviewed for counsel and guidance on decisions made 
within each of these areas. Not surprisingly, however, conflicting 
disclosures were found due to the myriad of designs devised over the 
past fifty to seventy-five years. In these cases, as in all, methods 
appearing most acclimated to the present problem were adopted. Several 
questionnaire designs were critiqued through written and open discussion 
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in a cormnunication research designs class instructed by Dr. Walter J. 
Ward at Oklahoma State University in the spring of 1978. A number of 
suggestions were adopted, and are so cited in certain sections below. 
Number of Steps or Points 
The gravity of the entire study probably rested more with this 
than any other single consideration pertaining to questionnaire design. 
The challenge was to meet all criteria of enhanced measurement sensitiv-
ity parameters desired of the S.D. scale itself. If too few steps were 
utilized, scale efficiency would be tempered due to coarseness. On the 
other hand, there would be no point in resolving gradations so fine that 
the scale extended beyond discriminative power of the central nervous 
system.l4 Nunnally reported another impinging factor to be considered 
is fatigue. 
The only exception to the rule that reliability increases with 
the number of scale steps would occur in instances where a large 
number of steps confused subjects or irritated them to the point 
where they became careless. Then it would be possible to find 
the reliability coming back down with, say, as many as 20 steps.l5 
Nevertheless, of paramount importance was the use of a high-
resolution device, if the intended pui·pose of critiquing the 7-step S.D. 
scale and attendant linguistic quantifiers was to be effected. Early, 
the notion was seized to utilize a straight-line, relatively unencum-
bered continuum. Such a design would make possible an infinite number 
of geometric points while not fatiguing the respondent into a state of 
carelessness. 
This is by no means an entirely new model. Goode and Hatt report 
use of a similar graphic continuum in which the respondent placed a 
check mark at a point on the line corresponding to his attitude on a 
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subject (seep. 18). Related devices have been cited.l6 In all those 
cases, however, there were numerical or descriptive weightings attendant 
to the scales. 
As a cross-check. on the design, a separate section utilizing a 100 
percent scale (numbers themselves constitute the continuum) was adminis-
tered.l7 This system seemed nearest, as numerical scales go, to the 
fluid concept strived for in the graphic scale. 
Scale Segmentation 
The prime consideration here was inclusion of graphic reference 
points~ Consistent with rationale above, no standard geometric/equi-
distant gradation marks were utilized. Thought was given to use of two 
specific references: (1) a midpoint hash to divide the positive and 
negative portions of the rule,l8 and (2) an orientation hash-mark linked 
to a given linguistic quantifier position (this position identified by 
Osgoodian convention) from which reference the respondent supplied the 
position of a neighboring quantifier as he so conceived it. 
A number of "pros" and "cons" were assembled for each, but the over-
riding vie\v of the research design class--because the principal objective 
of this study was to decrease design bias of the S.D. scale--was that any 
form of reference mark constituted some measure of bias in and of itself. 
As such, any and all should be dropped in favor of the unencumbered 
straight-line delineated above. 
Nature and Size of the Continuum 
Since the "unencumbered straight-line" scale concept was settled, 
the principal consideration here was physical length of the scale. A 
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number of researchers have endorsed Guilford's five-inch scale, and the 
dimension was adopted for this appUcation.l9 
Inclusion of Graphic or Numerical Anchors 
The rationale of the first two sections (above) was carried over 
to this area also. The suspicion that any method of weighting or seg-
mentation adversely could sway respondent replies was judged more criti-
cal by the designs class and author than fear of insufficient parley of 
the scale to a respondent (as discussed further below). 
Orientation of Scale 
The foremost consideration here was what quality or value would be 
affixed to, and represented by, bipolar points of the scale. To resolve 
this, Osgood's Table of Rotated Factor Loadings \vas consulted, and the 
adjective pair "good-bad" was chosen because of its high evaluational 
factor loading.20 
Since the particular adjective orientors were of little signifi-
cance in this work, compared to the study of their modifying adverbs 
(linguistic quantifiers), it was decided that one pair could be used for 
the entire battery of scales. There were several advantages to this 
route, including lessened likelihood of respondent confusion or an 
adverb/adjective multiplicative effect as has been hypothesized by some 
researchers.21 
Finally there was the question of whether to alternate "good" and 
"poor" ends of the scale to prevent what has been termed "response bias 
tendency." 22 However, this phenomenon tends most often to present it-
self in association with the "halo effect,"23 and was not felt to be a 
40 
significant factor here, since neither attitudes nor personalities were 
involved.24 On the other hand, possibility of respondent confusion or 
oversight of the scale reversals loomed as a substantial possibility. 
Accordingly, all scales were graduated left to right, 11 bad" to "good." 
Instructions/Descriptive Phrases 
To properly acquaint respondents with the questionnaire and orient 
them so that accurate, representative information was received was 
vitally important, for two reasons. First, the specific design of the 
scales was, if not unique, most likely one to 'tvhich respondents were not 
accustomed. Second, (in attempt to minimize or eliminate all biasing 
factors) the absence of numerical, verbal, .or graphic weighting/quanti-
fying labels could leave respondents baffled. Thus, considerable care 
was devoted to composition of the pretest instructions. 
Several early ideas and suggestions were rigorously adhered to. 
Use of the word "test" was avoided throughout the questionnaire, since 
this term has been knovm to not only evoke tension, but a range of 
Pavlovian responses in various human as well as infra-human subjects. 
Brevity was desired and subscribed to as much as possible. The 
rough draft of these instructions \vas submitted to the research design 
class, with a further reduction of nearly half its former size the 
result. 
Instructions ccmprised four parts: (1) an orientation, or back-
ground, on the subject being researched, (2) a statement of £Urpose of 
the work, (3) the situation, or subject being addressed in the question-
naire, and (4) three examples to acclimate respondents. In all three 
examples, the adjective pairs (bipolar terms) and adverbs (linguistic 
quantifiers) were unlike those utilized in the body of the question-
naire. These precautions, hopefully, minimized possibility of pre-
trial bias. 
Adaptability of Retrieved Data to Quantification/ 
Analysis 
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TI1is area presented no special problems or obstacles. Some 
scientists have shied away from unlabeled graphic scales, specifically 
because they do not facilitate analysis of data. 25 Sufficient space 
already has been devoted to justification for adoption of the device; 
therefore, this section only addresses the way in which scales were 
quantified and data extracted. 
Since an unsegmented continuum of any dimension implies an infinite 
number of geometric points, the only physically-limiting factor in this 
type scale's resolution is the ratio of the width of the hash-mark made 
by a given respondent's pen or pencil to the actual length of the scale. 
It was determined that the smallest practical unit of measure with this 
system is l/32nd of an inch. Since the conventional Osgoodian S.D. 
scale has seven points, theoretically this method offers an increased 
resolution factor of about 22 times ( 5 + 1/32 + 7 ). 
To quantify scales, then, it was only necessary to subject them 
individually to a ruler. (Scale quantification was expedited with an 
overlay grid segregated into base units of 32nds of an inch.) 
The backup "100 percent" scale presented no quantification prob-
lems, since the number submitted by the respondent constituted the 
value used for analysis. (The survey instrument is reprinted at full 
length in Appendix A. ) 
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Survey Procedure 
One-hundred questionnaires were printed and distributed, with a 
sufficient number of backup surveys for non-returns. A numbering sys-
tem was used in conjunction with respondent identification to eliminate 
names and extraneous marks from the questionnaire proper. 
Since this was not a survey of attitudes or opinions, a random 
sampling, per se, was not felt necessary.26 Nonetheless, a heterogen-:: 
eous sample was sought in age, occupation, ethnicity and geographic 
location. Geographic distribution of the survey ranged from Stillwater, 
Oklahoma, to Catania, Sicily. Ethnic backgrounds varied from Anglo-· 
American to Chinese (all were English-speaking respondents, however). 
Ages of respondents differed widely, and occupational pursuits ranged 
from receptionists to research scientists. (A complete tabulation of 
respondents is posted in Appendix B.) 
To minimize any effects of test sensitization, respondents were 
requested not to return to previously-marked scales to change responses. 
Subjects were directed to use ink pens as a further measure of enforcing 
this effort. 
No time limit was established for questionnaire completion. The 
typical response time fell between ten and fifteen minutes. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Data were treated in three segments: (1) absolute values assigned 
by respondents to linguistic quantifiers, (2) midpoint values of lin-
guistic quantifiers, as perceived by respondents, and (3) a comparison 
of absolute values assigned to linguistic quantifiers on a 5-inch, com-
pared to a 100-percent scale. 
How much distance on the 5~inch experimental scale did respondents 
allot each of the six linguistic quantifiers? In the first major analy-
sis, distance was measured in 32nds of an inch. Each 22/32nds of an 
inch converted to one meaning unit on the Osgood 7-point scale. (This 
was the case in all analyses of the 5-inch scale.) In other words, 
responses in this study showed the number of Osgood unit values assigned 
to varying degrees of good and bad. 
The author compared respondents' average unit values to Osgood's 
theoretical unit values for each linguistic quantifier of good and bad. 
For example, if respondents assigned an average unit value of 1.025 to 
"quite" bad, did this differ significantly from Osgood's theoretical 
value of 2.00? 
Further analysis in section one sought to determine if correspond-
ing quantifiers were assigned similar unit values. That is, were 
II • II d d II • II b d 1 d d' f h qu1te goo an qu1te a p ace about the same 1stance rom t e 
respective opposite ends of the scale by the average respondent, as 
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assumed by Osgood? 
A major concern in this first of the three-part analysis was 
Osgood's assumption of equal interval scaling; i.e., one unit of mean-
ing space between each contiguous pair of quantifiers. If respondents 
assigned a unit distance of, say, 1. 759 between "slightly" and "quite" 
bad, was this a significant departure from Osgood's theoretical distance 
of 1. 00? A further check on the equal interval assumption came with 
comparison of observed and theoretical distances between each possible 
pair of linguistic quantifiers. Osgood, for example, assumes that four 
units separate "very" good and "slightly" bad. By how many units did 
the respondents separate this pair of quantifiers? 
The second major analysis centered on midpoints of Osgood's scale 
units, rather than on whole- or absolute-unit values. Concern here was 
in how closely respondents' perceptions of linguistic quantifier abso-
lute values were to their perceptions of midpoint values. 
The final analysis dealt with the feasibility of using a 7-unit 
and 100-unit scale interchangeably. Would, for example, a particular 
linguistic quantifier be assigned about the same relative space on a 
7- as a 100-point (or percentage) scale? 
Absolute Unit Distances 
Between Bipolar Adjectives and Linguistic 
Quantifiers 
Given the bipolar and presumably linear continuum of the good-bad 
evaluative dimension, and assuming maximum intensity of meaning in the 
opposing adjectives, respondents were asked to designate degrees as 
described by adverbs serving as linguistic quantifiers. 
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For example, if the "bad" end represented the maximum of "bad," 
where on the 5-inch continuum would a respondent mark "slightly" bad? 
Such designations were made with a vertical hash mark along the solid-
line continuum. Distances were reported in 32nds of an inch. Each 
22/32nds of an inch on the author's 5-inch continuum represented one 
meaning unit on the Osgood scale. 
Linguistic quantifiers of good-bad were: "extremely," "very," 
"quite," 11 slightly," "neither, 11 and 11equally." The first four adverbs 
were applied to both sides of the continuum. 
A treatments-by-subjects variance analysis showed significant dif-
ferences between all descending adjacent pairs of linguistic quanti-:-
fiers; in other words, between adjacent intensities of good-bad (F= 
909.86, df=l4/1386, p<.OOl). Critical difference for pairs of adverbs 
was .2613, p<.Ol, df=99. Table II shows observed Osgoodian unit values 
which the average respondent assigned the varying degrees of good and/ 
or bad. 
Noteworthy observations from Table II involve the two extreme 
degrees and the middle degrees. Osgood, in his interpretation scale, 
considers "extremely" as the most positive (and negative) degree, 
followed by "quite." Yet, in his instructions to respondents, he sug-
gests the highest value be given on basis of a concept having "very" 
much of the adjective quality. Table II indicates that "extremely" and 
"very" comprise sigl.<ificantly different degrees of intensity in the 
minds of the 100 study respondents (6.726 vs. 6.213 and .688 vs •• 291, 
both p<.Ol, df=99). 
The study did support Osgood in his equating of "neither" and 
"equally." No significant unit differences occurred betvJeen the two 
nor were there differences between the repeated unit differences 
assigned to "neither" and "equally." The latter point implies, too, 
that respondents were consistent in perception of distances described 
by each of the midpoint linguistic quantifiers. Response consistency 
also was indicated on the reported measurements of "slightly" and 
"quite" bad. 
TABLE II 
OSGOODIAN UNIT VALUES ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS DEGREES OF GOOD 
AND BAD BY THE AVERAGE RESPONDENT 
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Adverbial 
Degrees 
Osgoodian Units 
Assigned by Respondent 
Extremely Good 
Very Good 
Quite Good 
Slightly Good 
Neither (Good nor Bad) 
Neither (Bad nor Good) 
Equally (Good and Bad) 
Equally (Bad and Good) 
Slightly Bad 
Slightly Bad 
Quite Bad 
Quite Bad 
Very Bad 
Extremely Bad 
Theoretical vs. Respondent Unit Values for 
Linguistic Quantifiers 
6. 726 
6.213 
5.659 
4.149 
3.550 
3.573 
3.501 
3.547 
2. 713 
2.784 
.949 
1.100 
.688 
.291 
Though the respondents' assigned values for adjacent quantifiers 
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conform to Osgood's theoretical hierarchy, the mean assigned value 
differed significantly from that used by Osgood, as shown in Table II 
(t=6.29, p<.Ol, df=9). 
All of the differences in the righthand column of Table III reflect 
lesser unit values than those prescribed by Osgood. Even the 
"extremely" quantifier drew from nearly one-third to seven-tenths lesser 
unit values from respondents than from Osgood. The five largest depar-
tures from Osgood's unit values were: Quite Bad, .975; Slightly Good, 
.851; Very Good, .787; and Extremely Bad, .709 units. 
TABLE.III 
COMPARISON OF OSGOODIAN AND RESPONDENT UNIT.VALUES 
OF LINGUISTIC QUANTIFIERS ALONG THE 
GOOD-BAD CONTINUUM 
Linguistic Osgood's Respondent 
Quantifier Unit Value Unit Value 
Extremely Good 7.00 6.726 
Very Good 7.00 6.213 
Quite Good 6.00 5.659 
Slightly Good 5.00 4.149 
Neither Good nor Bad 4.00 3.562 
Equally Good and Bad 4.00 3.524 
Slightly Bad 3.00 2.784 
Quite Bad 2.00 1.025 
Very Bad 1.00 .688 
Extremely Bad 1.00 .291 
Differences 
.274 
.787 
.341 
.851 
.438 
.216 
.975 
.312 
• 709 
.476 
Note: Identical values were given to the "very" and "extremely" 
degrees, and to the "neither" and "equally" degrees under the 
Osgood Unit-Value column, because he uses them interchangeably, 
as mentioned earlier. 
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To this point, the average respondent's perception of relative unit 
values of linguistic quantifiers is consistent with Osgood's, with the 
exception that "very" earns a lesser value than "extremely." The four 
quantifiers on which repeated measurements were taken seem to be reli-
able, in that respondents assigned insignificantly different values to 
them. This, again, indicated that perceptions of unit values of quan-
tifiers were consistent. 
Corresponding linguistic quantifiers were perceived to connote 
less intense degrees of "good," but more intense degrees of "bad." The 
differential was most evident with the corresponding "quite" quanti-
fiers. "Quite" good was rated .314 less good than theorized, while 
"quite" bad was rated nearly one unit lower (.975). So, the value 
assigned to "quite" differed more from the theoretical on the "bad" end 
of the continuum than on the "good. 11 
"Very," on the other hand, departed most from Osgood on the posi-
tive side. It was rated .787 units "less good," but only .312 units 
"more bad." Conversely, "extremely" good was only .274 units less good 
than claimed, while "extremely" bad was viewed .709 units "more bad." 
"Slightly" deviated most from Osgood on both ends of the continuum. It 
was rated .851 units less positive than claimed, but 1.216 units more 
negative. 
The above data suggest that "bad" connotatively may be more nega-
tive, while "good" ::.s connotatively less positive. And the degree of 
"more" and "less" varies. "Extremely," "quite," and "slightly" deviate 
less from Osgood on the positive than the negative side, w·hile "quite" 
deviates more on the negative than the positive. 
The greater-than-expected negative connotation of "bad" was most 
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evident when quantified by "slightly," "quite," and "extremely," respec-
tively. The less-than-expected positive connotation of "good" came 
mostly from the quantifiers "slightly" and "very," in that order. 
Thus far, Osgood's most over-estimated unit values, compared with 
respondents' perceptions, were on "very" good and "slightly" good. Most 
underestimated in intensity were "slightly," "quite," and "extremely" 
bad. 
At this point, the question arises about the comparative quantita-
tive meaning intensity of the presumed bipolar "good" and "bad." Per-
haps "bad" more nearly approaches zero in raters' minds, while "good" 
falls relatively short in connoting the ultimate positive. At any rate, 
the relative distance between adjacent linguistic quantifiers appears 
related to which side of the continuum serves as referent. The same 
could be said for intensity of meaning elicited by corresponding quan~ 
tifiers. 
A scan of the "respondent-unit-value" column in Table III indicates 
respondents adhere more to unit midpoints than to Osgood's prescribed 
whole-unit values. This matter is discussed in more detail on page 57. 
Observed vs. Theoretical Distances Between 
Adjacent Pairs of Linguistic Quantifiers 
On a solid line representing a single good-bad continuum, each of 
Osgood's linguistic quantifiers is allotted an equal unit of space, 
totaling seven in all. In other words, one unit of space would lie 
between each pair of contiguous quantifiers. But in Table IV, about 
half the perceived unit distances exceed one unit, while the remainder 
span less than one unit. 1 
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Distances between "quite" and "slightly" bad, for example, were 
perceived as 1.759 units--.759 more than theorized. More than half a 
unit (.513) separated "extremely" and "very" good, while .397 units were 
perceived between "extremely" and "very" bad. Since all the above dif-
ferences exceeded chance, doubt is cast on whether "extremely" and 
"very11 carry equal intensity of meaning or that "slightly11 and "quite" 
elicit only one unit distance in meaning. 
On the other hand, distance between "slightly" and the contiguous 
midpoints of "neither" and "equally" may have been over-estimated to 
date. Only about three-fourths a unit was perceived by respondents to 
separate "slightly" from "neither" and "equally" bad (.778 and .740, 
respectively). "Slightly" good stands only a respective .625 and .587 
units from "equally" and "neither." 
The one-unit expected difference between "extremely" and "quite" 
good was supported (1.000 vs. 1.067, p<.05), but respondents' perceived 
difference between "extremely" and "quite" bad was only .743 units--
.266 units less than expected. Meaning gap between "very" and "quite" 
bad was perceived to be only a little more than one-third unit (.337), 
or .663 units short of the theoretical. And respondents saw the "very"-
to-"quite" good gap as .554 units--.446 units below the expected. 
These findings lend further support to the previous implication 
that "very" probably quantifies somewhere between "extremely" and 
"quite"; therefore, it should not be used interchangeably with 
"extremely" in Osgood's instructions. 
The midpoint quantifiers of "neither" and "equally" were seen as 
interchangeable by respondents. The .038 unit distance was not signifi-
cant. 
TABLE IV 
NUMBER OF MEANING UNITS BETWEEN PAIRS OF LINGUISTIC QUANTIFIERS 
ASSIGNED BY OSGOOD, COMPARED WITH CORRESPONDING 
DISTANCES ASSIGNED BY STUDY RESPONDENTS 
Pairs of Osgood's 
Linguistic Theoretical Observed 
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Quantifiers Distances Distances Differences 
Slightly from 1.000 1. 759 .759 
Quite Bad 
Extremely from '.000 .513 .513 
Very Good 
Slightly from 1.000 1.510 .510 
Quite Good 
Extremely from .000 .397 • 39 7 
Very Bad 
Extremely from 1.000 1.067 .067 
Quit,e Good 
Neither from .000 .038 .038 
Equally 
Slightly Bad 1. 000 .778 -.222 
from Neither 
Slightly Bad 1.000 .740 -.260 
from Equally 
Extremely from 1. 000 
-.7·34 -.266 
Quite Bad 
Slightly Good 1.000 .625 -.375 
from Equally 
Slightly Good 1.000 .587 -. ld3 
from Neither 
Very from 1.000 .554 
-.446 Quite Good 
Very Bad from 1.000 .337 
-.663 Quite Bad 
54 
On the positive side of the good-bad continuum; i.e., from the mid-
point to "extremely" good, there was an average departure of .387 units 
from the theoretical, with more than half being due to over-estimation 
of the theoretical distance between adjacent pairs. Osgood assigns 
larger meaning distances than did the respondents between "slightly" 
good and the midpoints, and between "very" and "quite" good. Underesti-
mated theoretical distances were most notable between the contiguous 
pairs of "extremely" and "very," and "slightly" and "quite" good. 
From the midpoint to "extremely" bad, respondents' average devia-
tion from Osgood's theoretical distances between adjacent linguistic 
quantifiers was .856 units, considerably greater than the average devia-
tion on the positive end of the scale. Furthermore, nearly three-
fourths the deviation from Osgood on the scale's negative side was due 
to greater distances assigned by respondents than by Osgood. Respon-
dents saw notably larger meaning distance between "quite" and "slightly" 
bad, as well as between "extremely" and "very" bad. On the other hand, 
they perceived lesser meaning space between "slightly" bad and the mid-
point, between "extremely" and "quite" bad and between "very" and 
"quite" bad. 
Observed vs. Theoretical Distances Between All 
Pairs of Linguistic Quantifiers 
More insight into Osgood's claim of equal interval scale points is 
offered in Table V. Theoretical unit distances between each possible 
pair of linguistic quantifiers is compared with the corresponding dis-
tance assigned by the average respondent. 
Table V shows that the relative magnitude of theoretical distance 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL AND PERCEIVED DISTANCES 
BETWEEN 36 PAIRS OF LINGUISTIC QUANTIFIERS 
Pairs of 
Linguistic Theoretical Perceived 
Quantifiers Distance Distance 
Very Good-Slightly Bad 4.00 2.83 
Slightly Good-Very Bad 4.00 3.07 
Very Good-Extremely Bad 6.00 5.17 
Slightly Good-Slightly Bad 2.00 2.83 
Extremely Good-Slightly Bad !+. 00 3.21 
Extremely Good-Verj Bad 6.00 5.21 
Very Good-Equally 3.00 2.30 
Quite Bad-Slightly Bad 1.00 1. 61 
Quite Good-Slightly Bad 3.00 2.41 
Slightly Good-Extremely Bad 4.00 3.41 
Quite Good-Very Bad 5.00 4.41 
Very Good-Quite Good 1.00 • 42 
Very Good-Quite Bad 5.00 4.44 
Very Bad-Equally 3.00 2.53 
Slightly Bad-Equally 1.00 .53 
Slightly Good-Equally 1.00 .54 
Extremely Good-Extremely Bad 6.00 5.55 
Very Bad-Quite Bad 1.00 .39 
Extremely Good-Very Good 0.00 .38 
Extremely Bad-Very Bad 0.00 . 34 
Quite Good-Slightly Good 1.00 1. 34 
Extremely Bad-Slightly Bad 2.00 2.34 
Extremely Good-Equally 3.00 2.68 
Slightly Good-Quite Bad 3.00 2. 68 
Extremely Bad-Quite Bad 1.00 .73 
Quite Good-Extremely Bad 5.00 4.75 
Very Good-Slightly Good 2.00 1. 76 
Extremely Good-Quite Good 1.00 • 80 
Extremely Good-Quite Bad 5.00 4.82 
Very Good-Very Bad 6.00 4.83 
Quite Bad-Equally 2.00 2.14 
Extremely Good-Slightly Good 2.00 2.14 
Extremely Bad-Equa1_ly 3.00 2.87 
Quite Good-Equally 2.00 1. 88 
Quite Good-Quite Bad 4.00 4.02 
Very Bad-Slightly Bad 2.00 2.00 
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Difference 
-1.17 
- .93 
- . 83 
. 83 
- .79 
- . 79 
- . 70 
.61 
- . 59 
- . 59 
- .59 
- .58 
- .56 
- .47 
- . 47 
- . 46 
- .45 
- . 39 
.38 
. 34 
• 34 
. 34 
- .32 
- .32 
- .27 
- .25 
- . 24 
- .20 
- .18 
-1.17 
.14 
.14 
- .13 
- .12 
.02 
.00 
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between pairs of quantifiers is nearly the same (r=.96, df=34). That 
is, if the theoretical distance between "extremely" good and "extremely" 
bad is greater than that between "slightly" good and "slightly" bad, 
then the same held true, generally, for the respondents--and to about 
the same degree. 
However, the mean theoretical distance was significantly greater 
than the mean perceived difference (2.89 vs. 2.59 units distance, t= 
4.68, df=35, p<.OOl). 
What this indicates is that the average theoretical distance 
between the 36 possible pairs of quantifiers is 2.89 units--.30 units 
greater than that assigned by respondents. The picture becomes clearer, 
though, in the "difference" column of Table V. Distance between 27 of 
36 pairs of quantifiers was judged by respondents to be less than that 
theorized by Osgood. Eleven pairs showed greater distance than Osgood 
suggests. 
The greatest theoretical over-estimates were between quantifying 
pairs on opposite sides of the continuum, while all but two underesti-
mates were between pairs on the same side of the continuum from the 
middle. In other words, the farther apart the pairs were linguisti-
cally, the more Osgood tended to over-estimate the quantitative distance 
between them and vice versa. For instance, distance between contiguous 
pairs on the positive half of the scale was over-estimated an average of 
only .08 units and on the negative side by .06 units. But the distance 
between linguistic pairs on the opposite sides of the midpoint was over-
estimated about one-fourth unit, on the average. 
Compared with respondents, Osgood most over-estimated distances 
between "very" good and "slightly" bad, and "very" good to "very" bad 
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(by more than a unit). He assigns from one-half to more than .90 units 
additional to 10 other pairs than did the average respondent. Under-
estimated distances were most notable between "slightly" good and 
"slightly" bad (.61). 
Midpoint Distances 
Observed vs. Theoretical Midpoints of Linguistic 
Quantifiers 
On the semantic differential scale, a respondent's checkmark yields 
a whole unit value (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). Thus, if he marks the extreme 
space on the positive side, his score is 7, designating a meaning inten-
sity of 7. Yet, the most positive space could represent any intensity 
from 6 through 7, with a midpoint of 6.5, just as the midpoint of, say, 
the fourth or middle space, would yield a meaning space from 3 through 
4, with a midpoint of 3.5 (the halfway point on a scale of 7). 
In the second part of the study, each respondent marked on the 5-
inch experimental scale line the closest point to good where he per-
ceived "extremely" good to lie. Then he marked the farthest point from 
good where "extremely" good was perceived to lie. The author then took 
the midpoint of the two checkmarks and computed its total distance from 
good. This task was performed on four linguistic quantifiers, using 
both the good and bad end of the experimental scale as points of origin. 
The midpoints of "equally" and "neither" were omitted in the analysis.2 
The average respondent's midpoints, as compared to Osgood's, are 
shown in Table VI. All but two observed midpoints differed signifi--
cantly from the theoretical. The midpoint of "quite," as perceived by 
respondents, nearly duplicated Osgood's--on both sides of the scale. 
For "quite" good, the average respondent's midpoint was 5.49 meaning 
units, compared with Osgood's 5.50. On the bad side, respondents dif-
fered from Osgood only .03 units from the theoretical midpoint of 
"quite" (1. 4 7 vs. 1. 50). 
TABLE VI 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OBSERVED AND OSGOODIAN MIDPOINT VALUES 
FOR FOUR LINGUISTIC QUANTIFIERS ALONG EACH SIDE 
OF THE GOOD-BAD CONTINUUM 
Linguistic Observed Unit Osgood 
Quantifier Midpoint Midpoint Difference t-ratio 
Extremely Good 6.29 6.50 -.21 4.2683 
Very Good 5.91 6.50 -.59 10.5925 
Quite Good 5.49 5.50 -.01 .1645 
Slightly Good 4.15 4.50 -.35 6. 3177 
Slightly Bad 3.08 2.50 .58 11.8609 
Quite Bad 1. 47 1.50 -. 03 .4644 
Very Bad 1. 08 .so .58 9.1483 
Extremely Bad .74 .so .24 3.5139 
p 
<.001 
<.001 
n.s. 
<.001 
<.001 
n. s. 
<.001 
<.001 
In other observed-theoretical comparisons, respondents assigned 
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lower-valued midpoints to three linguistic quantifiers on the good side 
and higher values to three on the bad side. And there was an inverse 
relation bet\veen midpoint value and scale direction. For example, the 
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midpoint of "very" good was seen as .59 units below the theoretical, 
while "very" bad was assigned .58 units above. Similarly, "slightly" 
good's midpoint fell .35 units short of Osgood, while "slightly" bad 
earned .58 more units of meaning space. The "extremely" quantifier was 
judged short on the good and long on the bad (.21 and .24 units, respec-
tively). 
Table VI, in essence, says that quantifier midpoints are not as 
good as theorized, nor as bad. In other words, quantifiers of good and· 
bad tend to be "squashed" toward the center of a purported seven-point, 
equal-interval scale. 
Noteworthy, too, in Table VI are the extraordinarily large gaps in 
meaning between "quite" and "slightly," on both ends of the scale. 
Here, the midpoint analysis supports earlier reported findings. Also, 
the midpoints of "very" fall between "extremely" and "quite" on both 
sides of the scale, as reported earlier. 
Meaning Distances on Two Scales 
Comparison of 5-Inch·and lOO..;.Point ·scales 
In the third part of this study, six linguistic quantifiers were 
rated on a scale of 100 (or, "100-percent" scale). The quantifiers 
were: "extremely," "very," "quite," "slightly," "equally" and 
"neither." A respondent's rating automatically told what percentage of 
the scale was allotted to each quantifier. All comparisons in this 
phase were analyzed in percentage, rather than units, of meaning. How-
ever, to compare the 100-percent scale data with those gathered via the 
5-inch scale, the author had to standardize the measuring procedure. 
To illustrate, say respondent "A" wrote 90 on the 100-percent scale 
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for his rating of "extremely. 11 That consumed 90 percent of the scale. 
What percent of the 5-inch scale did he allot to "extremely"? Extremely 
what? Good or Bad? The 5~inch scale was divided in half, leaving 2.5 
inches or 80/32nds of an inch on either side. So, 80/32nds of an inch 
comprised 100 percent of the good side of the scale. (Likewise, for the 
bad side.) If respondent "A" had checked "extremely" good 70/32nds of 
an inch off center toward the good side of the scale, he would have 
rated "extremely" good 90 out of 100 percent. (Likewise, had that been 
the case from the midpoint toward the bad end of the scale.) 
Table VII gives the comparative percentages of the good and bad 
portions of the 5-inch and 100-percent scales assigned to six linguistic 
quantifiers. On the good side, the only significant difference in 
scales is on the "quite" quantifier, which netted 8.5 percent more space 
on. the 100-percent than the 5-inch scale (p<. 001). 
On the bad side, the quantifiers on the 5-inch scale were allotted 
a higher percentage of space over-all; significantly so, in one case. 
"Quite" bad got 4.2 percent more space on the 5-inch scale (p<.05). 
Conversely, "slightly" bad got 3.6 percent more space on the 100-percent 
scale (p<. 02). 
Any summary as to the probability of using the 5-inch and 100-
percent scales interchangeably would be that very little over-all dif-
ference in space was allotted to the average quantifier. Specifically, 
however, respondents saw "quite" good as comprising a larger percentage 
of meaning space on the 100-percent scale, while "quite" bad was 
allotted more space on the 5-inch scale. "Slightly" good and bad tended · 
to consume more space on the 100-percent scale. "Neither" and "equally" 
were viewed similarly on both scales. 
TABLE VII 
COMPARATIVE PERCENTAGES OF GOOD AND BAD PORTIONS OF SCALES 
ASSIGNED TO SIX LINGUISTIC QUANTIFIERS 
Bipolar Adjective 
Linguistic Good Bad 
Quantifier 5-inch 100-pct. dif 5-inch 100-pct. 
scale scale scale scale 
Extremely 92.73 94.28 -1.55 92.56 94.56 
Very 82.21 81.96 .25 84.50 82.12 
Very 80.07 82.53 -2.46 
Quite 65.37 73.95 ,-8.58 74.46 71.58 
Quite 76.36 72.15 
Slightly 20.52 23.14 -2.62 19.20 22.55 
Slightly 18.37 21.98 
Neither 50.91 50.51 
Neither 49.38 48.89 . 49 
Equally 49.21 49.88 ~ .67 
Equally 50.29 50.49 
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dif 
-2.00 
2.38 
2.88 
4.21 
-3.35 
-3.61 
. 40 
- • 20 
The paradigm and data of Table VIII revolve around equality of 
intervals in both the 5-inch and 100-percent scales. 1beoretically, the 
distance in percentage of meaning space should be "equal" between each 
pair of adjacent quantifiers. This would apply to both the good and bad 
sides of the scale. For the 5-inch and 100-percent scales to be used 
interchangeably, then, nearly equal percentages of space between corres-
TABLE VIII 
DISTANCE IN SCALE PERCENTAGE POINTS BETHEEN 
ADJACENT LINGUISTIC QUANTIFIERS* 
Bipolar Adjectives 
Good 
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Bad Adjacent Linguistic 
Pairs % of 
5-inch 
scale 
% of 
100-pct. 
scale 
% of 
5-inch 
scale 
% of 
100-pct. 
scale 
Extremely minus Very 11.59 12.03 8.06 12.44 
Extremely ··minus Quite 27.36 20.33 17.15 22.69 
Very minus Quite 15.77 8.30 9.09 10.25 
Quite minus Slightly 44.85 50.81 54.95 51.28 
Slightly minus Neither 19.90 22.03 21.37 21.10 
Slightly minus Equally 19.63 23.02 20.75 21.08 
*The average of repeated measures of "slightly" bad, "very" good and 
"quite" bad are utilized in this table. 
ponding adjacent quantifiers should appear. 
The obvious departure from equidistant meaning space in Table VIII 
is between "quite" and "slightly." The percentage of scale space 
between them averages more than halfway across the good and bad ends of 
both scales. This is double what it should be. 
Again, data imply that "very" probably falls nearly equidistant 
from "extremely" and "quite." But if "very" were disregarded and the 
scales were equal interval, then the difference between the adjacent 
quantifiers should consume about 33 percent of scale space. For 
example, if respondents' perceived distance between "extremely" and 
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"quite" good as 27.36 percent of the scale, then the presumed 33 percent 
difference represents an over-estimate of 21,8 percent, as shown in 
Table IX. 
TABLE IX 
PERCENT OF THEORETICALLY OVER- OR UNDERESTIMATED SPACE 
BETWEEN ADJACENT LINGUISTIC QUh~TIFIERS ON THE 
5-INCH AND 100-PERCENT SCALE 
Adjacent Linguistic 5-Inch 100-·Percent 
Quantifiers Scale Scale 
Extremely- minus Quite-Good 18.0%-0 39.0%-0 
Extremely- minus Quite-Bad 51. 5%-U 32.0%-0 
Quite- mi. nus Slightly-Good 34.5%-U 52.4%-U 
Quite- minus Slightly-Bad 64.8%-U 53. 9%-U 
Slightly-Good minus Neither 40.3%-0 23.0%-U 
Slightly-Bad minus Neither 36.0%-0 37.0%-0 
O=Percentage Over-estimated; U=Percentage Underestimated 
On the 5-inch scale, the largest over-estimation of meaning space 
on the part of Osgood was between the "slightly" and "neither" quanti-
fiers: 40.3 percent on the good side and 36 percent on the bad. He 
also over-estimated the distance between "extremely" and "quite" good by 
18 percent. 
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On the 100-percent scale, the equal-interval assumption over-
estimated the observed distance between "extremely" and "quite" good by 
39 percent. This was more than double the over-estimation between 
those two quantifiers on the 5-inch scale. The inflated difference gap 
between "slightly" bad and "neither," however, nearly was the same on 
the 100-percent as the 5-inch scale--37 percent compared with 36 
percent. 
Theoretically-underestimated meaning spaces occurred in both scales 
between "quite" and "slightly." However, on the good side of the scale, 
the underestimate was not as great on the 5-inch scale, while on the bad 
side, the 100-percent scale showed less underestimation. 
The scales \vere differentiated in two other instances. Percentage 
of the 100-percent scale allotted for meaning space between 11extremely" 
and "quite" bad was over-estimated 32 percent. It was underestimated 
more than 50 percent on the 5-inch scale. Conversely, the space between 
"slightly" good and "neither" was underestimated on the 100-percent 
scale (34 percent), but over-estimated on the 5-inch continuum. 
In summary, the two scales both over-estimated distances between 
two sets of quantifiers. On two other sets, one scale over-estimated, 
while the other underestimated. (This would indicate that the two 
scales should probably not be used interchangeably.) 
ENDNOTES 
1. In Table IV, "extremely" and "very" are presumed synonymous; 
therefore, not·. to differ in unit distance. Likewise, with "neither" and 
"equally. it Both are used interchangeably by Osgood. Note, too, that 
ten linguistic quantifiers are listed in Table III, instead of seven 
listed by Osgood. The purpose was to check on the feasibility of 
using "extremely" and "very" interchangeably, and "neither'' and "equally 11 
interchangeably. 
2. Since respondents were asked to mark the points closest and 
farthest from good that were "equally" good and bad, a midpoint could 
not be determined.· The midpoint from good would only be offse.t by the 
midpoint from bad. 
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CHAPTER V 
S~{Y, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Sununary 
This exploratory study examined two primary constructs of the 
semantic differential, with a view toward improving its measurement 
sensitivity. The semantic differential is a combined associational and 
scaling procedure used to measure human affective and emotive meaning. 
Sensitivity is one of six criteria proposed by its author, Charles E. 
Osgood, as an evaluation of the method. 
The specific items addressed were the equal-interval assumption of 
the S.D. scale, and the function of its adverbial units of intensity, or 
"linguistic quantifiers." Although a considerable amount of research 
has been expended on various facets of the system of semantic differen-
tiation, it appeared to this writer that little critical attention had 
been directed toward these two particular areas; this, despite sizeable 
evidence from researchers, scholars and academicians which would warrant 
it in both instances. 
To accomplish the study's objectives, a largely original scale 
design was devised, and a 33-item survey questionnaire composed. It was 
subsequently administered to a heterogeneous sample of respondents. 
Results were compiled in three groups, consistent with data furnished by 
the questionnaire. 
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Conclusions 
Fairly clearcut answers emerged to each of the study's hypotheses, 
dealing with sensitivity of the semantic differential. 
First, linguistic quantifiers were perceived in the ascending order 
of intensity espoused by Osgood, with the exception of the adverb 11very." 
Each successive quantifier was assigned a higher meaning unit value, 
ascending from "extremely" bad through the scale center-point to 
"extremely" good. But, as shown in Table II, page 48, respondents 
placed "very" more than half of a unit below "extremely" good and nearly 
.1+0 units above "extremely" bad, in respective cases. 11Very," then, 
conclusively fell between "e:xtremely" 'and 11quite" on the positive and 
negative sides of the scale, and must be viewed as a semantically unique 
linguistic quantifier with respect to others in this listing . 
• 
A second concern explored Osgood's claim that his scale represents 
an interval measurement level, and that the seven intervals are equi-
distant. In other words, the S.D. is purported to be an equal-interval 
scale. Psychological measurement units assigned by this study's re-
spondents clearly indicated that the scale was not equal-interval to 
them. 
From Table III, page 49, the average unit of meaning space the 
respondents assigned to the quantifying adverbs differ significantly 
from Osgood. Generally, quantifiers were seen to have less intensity of 
meaning on the good side of the scale, but more intensity on the bad 
side. Notably, "slightly" and "very" were viewed as comprising lesser 
degrees of "good" than Osgood claims, while "quite" and "extremely" bad 
were "more bad'' th.an he states. 
Continued evidence mounted that defied the equal interval assump-
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tion. For example, in Table IV, page 53, meaning distances between 
several adjacent pairs of quantifiers varied widely, differently and 
erratically from Osgood's assumptions. Most conspicuous were the mean-
ing distances between "quite" and "slightly." Contrary to the assumed 
1-unit gap, 1. 510 units separated "qui te11 and "slightly" good, while 
1. 759 units stood between "quite" and "slightly" bad. "Slightly" also 
fell short one-half to three-fourths units from the scale's midpoint. 
Assumed distance was 1 unit. Table IV shows that in both directions, 
0 d d · h · a· b " · " a sgoo most un erestJ.mates t e mean1.ng J.stance et'lveen qUJ.te an 
"slightly." 
Further data at this point also pointed to the ill-advisement of 
treating "extremely" and "very" synonymously. On the good side, a half 
unit stood between them. Similarly, a four~tenth unit spread appeared 
between "very" and "extremely" bad. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, "neither" and "equally" were assigned 
about the same degree of meaning space, indicating they can be used 
interchangeably. 
More evidence challenging the equal-interval assumption emerged 
from Table V, page 55, which reported perceived meaning distances be-
tween each of the 36 combinations of linguistic quantifiers. Respon.,... 
dents saw less distance than did Osgood between 27 of the 36 pairs. The 
farther apart the quantifying pairs, the more Osgood overestimates the 
quantitative meaning distance; e.g., the assumed distance between 
"slightly" good and "quite" bad (3.00 Osgoodian units) is more likely to 
be an over-estimation than the assumed unit spaces between "extremely" 
and "slightly" good (2.00 Osgoodian units). 
The final concern of the study was whether perceived midpoint 
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values of linguistic quantifiers varied significantly from the equal-
interval standard. This research indicated they do. Table VI, page 58, 
showed that all but two respondent-designated midpoints varied signifi-
cantly from Osgood's assumed midpoints. The theoretical midpoints of 
"quite" good and bad (5.50 and 1.50, respectively) did not differ 
beyond chance from those assigned by respondents. As with absolute unit 
values, midpoints of "quite" and "slightly" showed greater gap in seman-
tical meaning than Osgood assumes. So, too, the midpoint of "very" good 
and bad were perceived to lie between "extremely" and "quite." 
Perceived midpoints of q~antifiers do not extend out toward bipolar 
ends of the scale to a degree assumed (see Figures 18 and 19), but exhi-
bit a mild clustering effect toward the center of the scale as proposed 
by Hollingworth more than sixty years ago.l 
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Recommendations 
Science (is) the policy of subjecting The Word to the test of 
experience and of revising it accordingly, no matter how old 
The Word may be or who defends it . . . (a) method based not 
on the authority of age and prestige, but rather on the 
authority of observation and experiment.2 
y 
Conclusions derived from this research would suggest serious con-
sideration be given to several design modifications in the method of 
semantic differentiation. All have to do with what the study termed 
"encoding efficiency" of the S.D. measurement instrument. 
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According to derivations of the present research, the scale falters 
due to design limitations in two categories. First, assumption that a 
given group of linguistic quantifiers is geometrically represented by a 
respective set of equidistant points on the scale is errant. Accuracy of 
information retrieval is thus lost or stunted because of design bias in-
herent in the scale. Second, as proposed in numerous other works and 
evinced in this study, confinement of the scale to seven points or 
choices representing the spectrum of a stated quality is insufficient. 
Because of the significant variance between respondent-perceived and 
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Osgoodian adverbial midpoints on the S.D. scale, this study concludes 
that one of two avenues regarding the handling of linguistic quantifiers 
is mandated. Either these verbal weighting factors should be dissociated 
from the scale, or the method of segmentation of the scale should be re~ 
analyzed. Results of the research indicate the system as presently con-
ceived is not internally consistent or compatible. 
Possible routes of effecting these mociifications include selection 
of a revised group of adverbs which can be conclusively proven to repre-
sent an equidistant perceptua'J,. pattern on the scale. Otherwise, the 
adoption of the "unsegmented continuum" scale design utilized in this 
work is recommended as an alternative to the widely-recognized 7-step 
S.D. scale. An unsegmented design was seen as offering the enhanced 
resolution of a highly-segmented graphic scale while not risking the 
danger of respondent fatigue, which many_ scholars associate with the 
latter device. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
The results of this study intimate a variety of further research 
efforts related to semantic differential sensitivity. A listing of 
some of these as conceived by the writer include: 
1. Additional research on the "unsegmented continuum" scale theory 
of semantic differentiation. The design incorporated in this study 
could be juxtaposed to several segmented scale models, and, with direct 
comparisons of scales with varying degrees of step division, more exact-
ing determination of the ideal S.D. measurement instrument made. 
2. Extended tabulation of adverbial candidates, with the view of 
establishing a comprehensive list of linguistic quantifiers proven to 
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represent specific points along the scale continuum. This vlOuld aid 
both. the encoding process of the respondent vis-a-vis the instructional 
element, and the decoding process in data analysis and rationale of 
findings. 
3. Ascertainment of degree of need ~or, and effectiveness of the 
instructional element in semantic differe:ptial surveys. The composition 
of the survey instructions were adjudged by this writer as critical, 
since improper orientation may confuse and/or bias respondents, with the 
consequent compromise of retrieved data. 
4. Re-analysis of Osgood's List of Adjectival Pairs3 for respec-
tive conformity of opposite polar intensities--possibly using this 
method, as reflected on page 51 of the study. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUCTIONS 
Please write your name on the outside of the folder, below the 
printed number. Hrite that number, not your name, on the upper right-
hand corner of this page. Mark all responses in ink. 
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Since this is a formal experiment·, it is necessary to have your 
close cooperation. Your replies should represent your mvn judgment. Do 
not discuss items in the survey with those around you. There are no nec-
essarily right or wrong answers. If you do have a question, refer it to 
the administrator. 
The most effective and important means with which we communicate 
with one another is by the written or spoken word. Little scientific 
data, however, has been accumulated regarding how people express and 
interpret words. 
The purpose of this experiment is to discover relative meanings of 
certain words by getting ratings of the words on a set of descriptive 
scales. 
For instance, in describing Marilyn Monroe, one might say "She was 
an exceptionally beautiful woman." If you never knew of Marilyn Monroe, 
how beautiful would you feel she was--given this description? Providing 
you interpreted "exceptionally" to mean a high degree of beauty, you 
might accordingly (but not necessarily) mark a scale which represents 
the entire range of this quality, or lack of it, thus: 
Ugly Beautiful --------------------------~----
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This is a three-part questionnaire. The first section consists of a 
number of scales labeled with a given quality. Imagine that the scale 
represents the entire spectrum of that quality. 
For instance, in a scale marked 
Dull Sharp 
--------------------------------
the point at the extreme left end of the line would represent the 
extreme value of dull, or ''dullest." Similarly, the point at the right 
end of the line would represent the "sharpest" value of sharp. 
Thus, if the description paired with the scale said "moderately". 
dull, you would place a hash mark at the point on the scale which would 
most approximately represent moderately dull to you. 
In this questionnaire, it is important that you give your first 
impression to the modifier described. Please do not return to a scale 
you have previously marked and change your response, 
·1) 
Slightly Bad: 
Bad· Good 
-------------------------------------------------------
.2) 
Quite Good: 
Bad Good 
-------------------------------------------------------
3) 
Very Good: 
Bad Good ~-----------------------------------------------------
Neither Bad 
nor Good: 
Bad~·------------------------------------------------------Good 
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5) 
Slightly Good: 
Bad Good 
--------------------------------------------------------
6) 
Slightly Bad: 
Bad Good 
---------------------------------------------------------
7) 
Extremely Bad: 
Bad Good 
-------------------------------------------------------
- 8) 
Equally Good 
and Bad: 
Bad Good 
-------------------------------------------------------
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9) 
Quite Bad: 
Bad ___________________________________________________ Good 
10) 
Very Good: 
Bad 
---------------------------------------------------
11) 
Equally Bad 
and Good: 
Good 
Bad 
·---------------------------------------------------Good 
12) 
Very Bad: 
Bad ____________________________________________________ ___ Good 
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13) 
Extremely Good: 
Bad 
-----------------------------------------------------
14) 
Neither Good 
nor Bad: 
Good 
Bad Good 
---------------------------------------------------------
15) 
Quite Bad: 
Bad __________________________________________________________ Good 
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The second part of this questionnaire is similar to the section you 
have just completed in that, once again, we ask for your immediate 
impressions to the items described. 
Here you are asked to respond to "maximum limits" in each direction 
on the scale where a given description could lie. 
For instance: 
Ugly ____________________________ ~Beautiful 
a) Place a mark at the closest point to 
beautiful where "moderately" beautiful 
could lie, and label "a". 
b) Place a mark at the furthest point 
from beautiful where "Moderately11 beautiful 
could lie, and label "b". 
Your resultant scale might accordingly (but not necessarily) appear 
as follows: 
lJ. t1.. 
Again, as in the first part of this survey, the point at the extreme 
left end of the line would represent the extreme value of ugly, or 
"ugliest." Similarly, the point at the right end of the line would 
represent the "most beautiful" value of beautiful. 
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1) 
Bad Good 
a) Place a mark at the closest point to Bad where you feel "Quite Bad 
could lie, and label 11a". 
b) Place a mark at the farthest point away from :Sad where you feel 
"Quite" Bad could lie, and label "b". 
2) 
Bad Good 
a) Place a mark at the closest point to Good where you feel "Extremely" 
Good could lie, and label "a". 
b) Place a mark at the farthest point away from Good where you feel 
"Extremely" Good could lie, and label "b". 
3) 
Bad Good 
a) Place a mark at the closest point to Good where you feel "Equally" 
bad and Good could lie, and label "a". 
b) Place a mark at the farthest point away from Good where you feel 
"Equally" Bad and Good could lie, and label "b". 
4) 
Bad Good 
a) Place a mark at the closest point to Bad where you feel "Extremely" 
Bad could lie, and label "a". 
b) Place a mark at the farthest point away from Bad where you feel 
"Extremely" Bad could lie, and label "b". 
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5) 
Bad ____________________________________________________________ Good 
a) Place a mark at the closest point to Neither Good nor Bad where you 
feel "Slightly" Bad could lie, and label "a". 
b) Place a mark at the farthest point away from Neither Good nor Bad 
where you feel "Slightly" Bad could lie, and label "b". 
6) 
Bad Good 
a) Place a mark at the closest point to Bad where you feel 
"Very" Bad could lie, and label "a". 
b) Place a mark at the farthest point away from Bad where you feel 
"Very" Bad could lie, and label "b". 
?) 
Bad Good 
a) Place a mark at the closest point to Good where you feel 
"Very" Good could lie, and label "a". 
b) Place a mark at the farthest point away from Good where you feel 
"Very" Good could lie, and label "b". 
8) 
Bad Good 
a) Place a mark at the closest point to Equally Good and Bad where 
you feel "Slightly" Good could lie, and label "a". 
b) Place a mark at the farthest point away from Equally Good and 
Bad where you feel "Slightly" Good could lie, and label "b". 
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9) 
Bad Good 
a) Place a mark at the closes:t point to Good where you feel "Slightly" 
Good could lie, and label "a". 
b) Place a mark at the·farthest point away from Good where you feel 
"Slightly" Good could lie, and label "b". 
10) 
Bad Good 
a) Place a mark at the closest point to Good where you feel "Quite" 
Good could lie, and label "a". 
b) Place a mark at the farthest point away from Good where you feel 
"Quite" Good could lie, and label "b". 
11) 
Bad Good 
a) Place a mark at the closest point tq Bad where you feel "very" Bad 
could lie, and label "a". 
b) Place a mark at the farthest·point away from Bad where you feel 
"Very'' Bad could lie, and label "b". 
12) 
Bad Good 
a) Place a mark at the closest point to Equally Bad and Good where you 
feel "Slightly" Good could lie, and label "a" . 
• b) Place a mark at the farthest point away from Equally Bad and Good 
where you feel "Slightly" Good could lie, and label "b". 
Finally, on a scale o;f; 0 (least) to 100 (:most), where would you 
rate the following words: 
Yery 
Equally 
Quite 
Extremely 
Neither 
Slightly 
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APPENDIX B 
SURVEY POPULATION 
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,TABLE X 
SURVEY POPULATION 
Respondent 
Number Sex Age Occupation Ethnicity Geographic Location 
1. M 56 Research Chemist Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
2. F 56 Housewife Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
3. F 85 Retiree Caucasian Aline, Okla 
4. F 63 Retiree Caucasian McWillie, Okla 
5. F 27 Secondary Education Caucasian Catania, Sicily 
6. M 26 Naval Officer Caucasian Oakland, Calif 
7. M 29 Businessman Caucasian Dallas, Texas 
8. F 27 Court Reporter Caucasian Allen, Texas 
9. M 29 Air Force Officer Caucasian Omaha, Nebraska 
10. F 25 Broadcasting Caucasian Wichita, Kansas 
11. M 30 Engineer Chinese Stavanger, Norway 
12. M 30 Police Detective Caucasian Rose Hill, Kansas 
13. F 28 Nurse Caucasian Wichita, Kansas 
\0 
1-' 
TABLE X (Continued 
Respondent 
Number Sex Age Occupation Ethnicity Geographic Location 
14. l1 30 Technician Caucasian Tulsa, Okla 
15. H 52 Common Laborer Negroid Denver, Colorado 
16. H 29 Common Laborer Caucasian Dewey, Okla 
17. M 56 Clerk Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
18. H 50 Banker Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
19. F 27 Clerk Caucasian Houston, Texas 
20. H 21 Golf Pro Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
21. F 46 Housewife Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
22. F 78 Retiree Caucasian Waco, Texas 
23. F 73 Retiree Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
24. M 42 Engineer Caucasian Dewey, Okla 
25. F 47 Housewife Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
26. H 46 Chemist Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
27. F 54 Housewife Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
\0 
N 
TABLE X (Continued) 
Respondent 
Number Sex Age Occupation 
28. F 56 Clerk 
29. F 59 Typist-Receptionist 
30. M 25 Student 
31. M 49 Receptionist 
32. F 24 Housewife· 
33. M 31 Veterinarian 
34. F 22 Dietician 
35. M 23 Farmer 
36. F 22 Student 
37. M 55 College Professor 
38. M 35 Photographer 
39. F 33 Elementary Education 
40. F 34 Salesperson 
Ethnicity 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Caucasian 
Geographic Location 
Tulsa, Okla 
Bartlesville, Okla 
Stillwater, Okla 
Pawhuska, Okla 
Terre Haute, Indiana 
Terre Haute, Indiana 
Amorita, Okla 
Byron, Okla 
Arkansas City, Kansas 
Stillwater, Okla 
Tulsa, Okla 
Miami, Florida 
Indianapolis, Ind 
\0 
w 
JABLE X (Continued) 
.Respondent 
Number Sex Age Occupation Ethnicity Geographic Location 
41. M 46 Technician Caucasian Indianapolis, Ind 
42. M 19 Student Caucasian Tulsa, Okla 
43. F 18 Student Negroid. Oklahoma City, Okla 
44. F 17 Student Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
45. M 20 Reporter Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
46. M 45 Plant Foreman Caucasian Norman, Okla 
47. F 21 Student Negroid Tulsa, Okla 
48. F 19 Receptionist Caucasian Tulsa, Okla 
49. M 21 Clerk Caucasian Oilton, Okla 
50. F 20 Student Puerto Rican Stillwater, Okla 
51. M 19 Student Caucasian Enid, Okla 
52. M 20 Student Negroid Stillwater, Okla 
53. F 18 Student Caucasian Tulsa, Okla 
TABLE X (Continued) 
Respondent 
Number Sex Age Occupation Ethnicity Geographic Location 
54. M 19 Student Negroid Lawton, Okla 
55. M 25 Editor Caucasian Altus, Okla 
56. F 20 Student Mexican Stillwater, Okla 
57. M 22 Student Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
58. M 23 Store Manager Negroid Ponca City, Okla 
59. F 19 Student Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
60. M 35 College Professor Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
61. F 20 Student Chinese Stillwater, Okla 
62. M 53 Clerk Caucasian Pawhuska, Okla 
63. M 48 College Professor Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
64. F 19 Receptionist Caucasian Shawnee, Okla 
65. F 57 Secretary Caucasian Akron, Ohio 
66. M 39 Film Producer Caucasian Marianna, Ark 
TABLE X (Continued) 
Respondent 
Number Sex Age Occupation Ethnicity Geographic Location 
67. F 27 Secretary Caucasian J?artlesville, Okla 
68. F 51 Secretary Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
69. M 52 Engineer Caucasian Dewey, Okla 
70. F 33 Chemist Caucasian Indianapolis, Ind 
71. M 37 Archaeologist Caucasian Indianapolis, Ind 
72. M 52 College Professor Caucasian Glencoe, Okla 
73. M 17 Student Caucasian Glencoe, Okla 
74. F 63 Housewife Caucasian Santa Rosa, Calif 
75. M 64 Agricultural Specialist Caucasian Santa Rosa, Calif 
76. F 36 Cashier Caucasian Los Angeles, Calif 
77. M 37 Researcher Caucasian Los Angeles, Calif 
78. F 52 Secretary Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
79. M 16 Student Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
TABLE ,X (Continued) 
Respondent 
Number Sex Age Occupation Ethnicity Geographic Location 
80. F 68 Retiree Caucasian Medford, Okla 
81. M 69 Retiree Caucasian Medford, Okla 
82. F 71 Retiree Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
83. M 73 Retiree Caucasian Brownwood, Texas 
84. M 62 Banker Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
85. F 54 Housewife Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
86. F 19 Student Polynesian Stillwater, Okla 
87. F 19 Student Caucasian Ponca City, Okla 
88. F 18 Clerk Caucasian Cushing, Okla 
89. F 19 Student Caucasian Tulsa, Okla 
90. F 19 Student Caucasian Jet, Okla 
91. F 21 Clerk-typist Caucasian Wichita, Kansas 
92. M 58 Lawyer Caucasian Morrison, Ok1a 
!ABLE X (Continued) 
Respondent 
Number Sex Age Occupation Ethnicity Geographic Location 
93. F 23 Secretary Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
94. F 22 Salesperson Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
95. F 26 Secretary-Receptionist Caucasian Miami, Okla 
96. F 32 Secretary Caucasian Stillwater, Okla 
97. M 20 Army Medic Caucasian San Antonio, Texas 
98. F 39 Accountant Caucasian San Francisco, Calif 
99. F 37 Housewife Caucasian Santa Rosa, Calif 
100. M 59 Technician Caucasian Bartlesville, Okla 
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